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Reasons have become a central topic in philosophy. Epistemologists study reasons for belief.
Moral philosophers assess reasons for action. And numerous metaethicists argue that all
normative notions can ultimately be analyzed in terms of the concept of a reason. However,
philosophers are not the only ones who talk about reasons. The Corpus of Contemporary
American English yields over 10,000 examples of sentences containing the phrase “reason to
[verb]”, e.g. “reason to believe” and “reason to do”. What, then, is the meaning of reason
claims in colloquial language? This dissertation offers a theory of meaning for colloquial talk
of reasons, focusing on sentences of the form “There is reason to believe that P”. I argue that
claims about reasons are a type of modal language. Familiar modals like “ought”, “might”,
and “must” describe how things stand with relevant bodies of information, e.g. “You must
pay your taxes” describes the relevant laws as requiring you to pay your taxes. I show
that reason claims describe relevant information in an analogous manner: “There is reason
to believe that P” describes the relevant knowledge as counting in favor of believing that
P. This theory has far-reaching implications for recent debates about reasons and modals.
First, the language of reasons pressures us to revise widely held views about the meaning
of epistemic modals like “might”: I show that it is talk of reasons for belief that describes
knowledge, not epistemic modal language. Second, I argue that this semantic fact is best
explained by a conceptual thesis: our pre-theoretical concept of a reason for belief is that of
an item of knowledge, not a mere fact. Finally, once we see that “epistemic” modals have
no special connection to knowledge, we are in a position to diagnose much of the confusion
surrounding the formulation of fallibilism in epistemology. I argue that it is a mistake to
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rely on intuitions about epistemic modals to assess the truth of fallibilism, and I propose an
alternative methodology for determining whether fallibilism is true.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The past several decades have witnessed a surge of philosophical interest in reasons. Epis-
temologists investigate the nature of reasons for belief.1 Ethicists investigate the nature
of reasons for action.2 And numerous metaethicists argue that all normative notions can
ultimately be analyzed in terms of the concept of a reason.3
The jumping-off point of this dissertation is the observation that philosophers are not
the only ones who talk about reasons: claims about reasons are commonplace in colloquial
language. For example, the Corpus of Contemporary American English yields over 10,000
examples of sentences containing the phrase “reason to [verb]”, including phrases like “reason
to believe”, “reason to do”, and “reason to feel”. Languages ranging from Cantonese, to
German, to Spanish all contain roughly synonymous expressions.
The prevalence of reason-talk in colloquial language raises the following question: How
should we theorize about the meaning of reason claims in ordinary language? Despite the
recent interest in reasons, little work has been done to address this question. Philosophers
have devoted a great deal of attention to the meaning of normative terms like “ought”, but
the parallel investigation into the semantics of reasons is still at an early stage.
Let me be clear about the distinctively semantic investigation I undertake in this disser-
tation. The recent literature on reasons is rife with proposals for what we might refer to as
the metaphysics of reasons. The questions at issue here are:
• What is the ontology of reasons? Are reasons facts, mental states, propositions, or
something else?
1See, for example, the papers collected in Reisner and Steglich-Petersen (2011).
2See, for example, the papers collected in Sobel and Wall (2009).
3See, for example, Parfit (2011), Scanlon (1998, 2014), and Skorupski (2010).
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• What makes something a reason for an act or an attitude? Is it possible to give a
reductive analysis of the reason-for relation? And just how many relata are there in the
reason-for relation?
• Is the concept of a reason the most fundamental normative concept? Or should we
understand reasons in terms of notions like obligation, rationality, or fittingness?
Contrast the questions above with those concerning the semantics of reasons:
• Where should we locate natural language talk of reasons in a broad linguistic taxonomy?
Are claims about reasons simply ordinary predications, or do they have some other type
of structure?
• What are the truth-conditions of claims about reasons in ordinary language? Do these
claims express propositions, give voice to attitudes, issue in commands, or perform some
other function?
• What kind of linguistic mechanisms determine the meaning of sentences containing reason
claims? What is the compositional semantics of natural language talk of reasons?
These latter questions will be the subject of this dissertation. Our questions here are thor-
oughly empirical. They are to be settled by careful attention to how ordinary speakers
actually use the language of reasons. This type of investigation may well have consequences
for philosophical theorizing about reasons and related matters—and I will argue that it does.
But the influence should not go in the other direction. Our subject here is natural language
semantics, not the semantics of the true normative theory of reasons revealed by some type
of philosophical reflection. In short, my aim is not to say how we should talk about reasons
but rather how we do talk about reasons.
I proceed as follows. Chapter 2 argues that claims about reasons are a type of modal
language. Familiar modals like “ought”, “might”, and “must” describe how things stand with
relevant bodies of information, e.g. “You must pay your taxes” describes the relevant laws as
requiring you to pay your taxes. I show that reason claims describe relevant information in
an analogous manner: There is reason to believe that φ describes the relevant knowledge as
counting in favor of believing that φ. I then present a compositional semantics for reason-
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talk that demonstrates how the semantics of reasons mirrors a plausible metaphysics of the
reason-for relation.
Chapter 3 argues that the language of reasons pressures us to revise widely held views
about the meaning of epistemic modals like “might”. On the canonical semantics for epis-
temic modals, it might be that φ describes φ as compatible with the contextually relevant
knowledge—hence the name “epistemic” modal. But I show that this theory faces a problem:
if talk of reasons for belief and epistemic modal language both describe relevant knowledge,
then we cannot explain why each type of language differs in how it embeds in complex sen-
tences. I argue that the solution lies in abandoning the canonical semantics for epistemic
modals: it is talk of reasons for belief that describes knowledge, while talk of what might
be the case describes facts that may or may not be known by anyone. In addition, I argue
that this semantic difference reveals a key feature of our pre-theoretical concept of a reason
for belief. Many philosophers hold that reasons are simply facts—facts that count in favor
of acts or attitudes. The reasons we possess are then understood as facts to which we enjoy
some kind of epistemic access. I argue that this theory has things backwards. It is not as
though the world contains reasons for belief that out there existing independently of human
thought. Instead, a fact is intelligible as a reason for belief only in relation to a thinker
who could easily come to be aware of this fact. This point about our concept of a reason
for belief explains why talk of reasons for belief describes relevant knowledge: when we talk
about reasons for belief, we talk about knowledge because this is what we take reasons for
belief to be.
Chapter 4 uses the preceding investigations in semantics to draw out several consequences
for epistemology. Once we see that “epistemic” modals have no special connection to knowl-
edge, we are in a position to diagnose much of the confusion surrounding the formulation
of fallibilism. It is often thought that fallibilism can be equivalently characterized as both
(a) the view that knowledge is consistent with the possibility of error, and (b) the view that
knowledge can be based on non-entailing evidence. But on my own semantics for epistemic
modals, there is no equivalence between (a) and (b), since epistemic modals like “possible”
do not describe states of evidence or any other epistemic state. In fact, I argue that epis-
temic modals have no place in the formulation of fallibilism at all. It is therefore a mistake
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to rely on intuitions about epistemic modals to assess the truth of fallibilism, and I propose
an alternative methodology for determining whether fallibilism is true.
Chapter 5 expands on the semantics for epistemic modals advanced in Chapter 3 by
addressing the question of the semantics of probability modals. I argue that the semantics of
probability modals is best understood in terms of a framework based on probability measures.
I show that the most sophisticated non-probabilistic alternative faces important problems
that have no analogue for a semantics based on probability measures. I conclude by sketching
a novel version of the latter semantics that captures intuitive judgments about the logic of
probability-talk even in the context of infinitely large domains of epistemic possibilities.
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2.0 REASONS AS MODALS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to defend the following general claim: reason-talk is a type of
modal language. More precisely, reason claims describe how things stand with relevant
bodies of information, where the relevant information is determined by the same linguistic
mechanisms that govern the interpretation of modals like “ought”, “might”, and “must”.
My aim here is to set out only the general shape of this semantics, focusing particularly
on the language of so-called normative reasons, i.e. reasons that serve to justify acts and
attitudes. I will argue that such reason claims exhibit key features that place them as part
of modal language. And I will use this characterization to give a sketch of the compositional
semantics of reasons. As we’ll see, there turns out to be a connection between the semantics
and metaphysics of reasons after all: I argue that the former actually reflects the latter.
2.2 BACKGROUND: THE LANGUAGE OF REASONS
I begin by setting out some data about the type and distribution of reason claims in natural
language. This data will form the basis of the semantic investigation to follow.
Natural language talk of (normative) reasons comes in three main varieties:
Relational Reason Claims: φ is (a) reason to ψ/reason for ψ-ing
Reason Existentials: there is (a) reason to φ/reason for φ-ing
Possessive Reason Claims: S has (a) reason to φ/reason for φ-ing
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Here are some examples of each that contain count noun uses of “reason”:
(1) Anytime you get stopped, it is a reason to be afraid.1
(2) If there is a reason for hope, it is that the pundits’ hostile account of conservatism has
an element of truth.2
(3) Every sponsor has a reason for being here.3
Each of our three main varieties can also contain mass noun uses of “reason”:
(4) The Lone Peak tram is reason enough to ski Big Sky (never mind the other 32 lifts).4
(5) There is reason to believe that not having a car isn’t just a consequence of poverty—it’s
a barrier to escaping it.5
(6) For now, Miami has reason to cheer.6
Each variety is also gradable and participates in comparatives:
(7) Being laid off is an excellent reason to travel.7
(8) There’s little reason to believe Brady won’t be an elite player in 2015, but there’s even
less reason to believe he’ll remain one in 2017, 2018 or whatever years lay down the
road.8
(9) It’s too expensive to live here unless you have a very good reason to do so.9
Finally, each type of reason claim readily embeds in a variety of constructions, such as
questions, conditionals, and attitude reports:
(10) So, the rise in the sector made the indexes look more correlated. Is that a reason to
throw international investing out the door? No.10
1“In metro Denver illegally, Arturo Garcia worked and lived in shadows,” Tom McGhee, Denver Post,
2015.
2“Political Constitutionalism,” Ramesh Ponnuru, National Review, 2014.
3“NASCAR’s growth slows after 15 years in fast lane,” Nate Ryan, USA Today, 2006.
4“Size Matters,” Drew Pogge, Skiing, 2014.
5“Auto-Mobility,” Margy Waller, Washington Monthly, 2005.
6“A Ballpark That May Be Louder Than the Fans,” Michael Kimmelman, New York Times, 2012.
7Quoted in “Lights! Camera! Travel!; Travel Channel course gives aspiring journalists digital film train-
ing,” Jayne Clark, USA Today, 2009.
8“NFL’s Best QB Situations,” Patrick Daugherty, Rotoworld, 2015.
9“You Can’t Kill Mr. Goodbar,” Alexander Nazaryan, Newsweek Global, 2015.
10Quoted in “Think Globally,” James K. Glassman, Washington Post, 2004.
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(11) If there is no pathology, if there’s no pain and suffering, then there’s no reason for
medicine to be there.11
(12) The Rev. Kenneth Samuel believes he has a reason to be challenging incumbent Demo-
cratic Rep. Earnest “Coach” Williams in DeKalb County’s District 89 primary.12
Let me turn now to my proposal for the semantics of this language.
2.3 THE MODAL MODEL
I will argue that the language of reasons is best understood as a species of modal language.
This might appear to be a puzzling claim. Modal language is often understood as language
concerning possibility and necessity. But it’s not obvious that talk of reasons concerns either.
It might also appear that talk of normative reasons is simply of the wrong linguistic category
to count as part of modal language. “reason”—in the sense at issue here—is a noun, but
we typically think of modal language as involving auxiliary verbs like “might” and “must”,
adjectives like “possible”, and adverbs like “possibly”. And even if we do sometimes employ
modal nouns like “possibility”, the noun “reason” does not itself refer to some possible state
of affairs. What, then, could it mean to locate the language of reasons in the category of
modal language?
The answer lies in a more expansive conception of modal language, perhaps more familiar
to linguists than philosophers. On this conception, modal language is connected to the
general phenomenon—sometimes known as “displacement”—in which we use language to
talk about things other than the here and now. In particular, modal language allows us to
talk about states of affairs that need not be real or actual.
Here is how Paul Portner puts the point:
[M]odality is the linguistic phenomenon whereby grammar allows one to say things about,
or on the basis of, situations which need not be real. Let’s take an example: I say “You
11“The Greatest Gift: Genetic Engineering to Save a Child,” John Stossel and Elizabeth Vargas, ABC
2020, 2007.
12“Voter ire a factor in races for state seats; Poll numbers reveal soaring disapproval with incumbents,”
Aaron Gould Sheinin, Altanta Journal Constitution, 2010.
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should see a doctor.” I am saying something about situations in which you see a doctor;
in particular, I am saying that some of them are better than comparable situations in
which you don’t see a doctor. Notice that what I say can be useful and true even though
you do not see a doctor. Thus, what I say concerns situations which need not be real
(Portner (2009, 1)).
Now, it should be uncontroversial that reason claims are part of modal language in this
broad sense. Suppose I say the following:
(13) There is reason to believe that a large asteroid is headed on a collision course with the
Earth.
Intuitively, what I said can be true even if no one—including myself—actually forms the
belief that an asteroid is going to hit the Earth. The sentence can also be true even if it
turns out that the my data is misleading, and the asteroid will actually miss the Earth ever
so slightly. The reason claim therefore allows us to talk about two states of affairs, neither
of which are represented by the sentence as being actual: (i) the state of affairs in which
someone believes that an asteroid will hit the Earth; (ii) the state of affairs in which an
asteroid is on a course to hit the Earth.
However, if this were the only sense in which reason claims characterize potentially non-
actual states of affairs, then my thesis of “reasons as modals” would be of little interest.
Consider:
(14) I want to believe that you are telling the truth.
This sentence exhibits both of the modal features we just saw above in the case of reason
claims. That is, (9) can be true even if no one actually believes you are telling the truth,
and (9) can be true even if you are not actually telling the truth. What we see here is that
the infinitive phrase to believe that φ itself carries a modal meaning: the phrase represents
neither the belief that φ nor φ itself as being the case.
Let us refer to the broad category of modal language just discussed as the general cate-
gory of modality. Contrast the latter with what I will call the linguistic category of modality.
Modal language in the general sense characterizes potentially non-actual states of affairs.
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Modal language in the more restricted, linguistic sense characterizes potentially non-actual
states of affairs in a particular way—namely, by characterizing how things stand with rele-
vant bodies of information.
For example, suppose I say:
(15) It might rain tonight.
On the received semantics for epistemic modals like “might”, (10) describes rain as compat-
ible with the contextually relevant knowledge—e.g. the speaker’s knowledge, some group’s
knowledge, or the knowledge the speaker or group could easily come obtain. In other
words, the modalized sentence allows us to talk about a potentially non-actual state of
affairs—namely, rain tonight—by describing how things stand with some relevant body of
information—namely, that the relevant knowledge is compatible with the content it rains
tonight.
Other fragments of modal language are thought to work in exactly the same way. On
Angelika Kratzer’s canonical semantics (Kratzer (1977, 1981, 2012)), modals like “might”,
“must”, “ought”, and “should” characterize two different bodies of information: information
determined by what she calls the modal base and the ordering source. Both are formally
represented as functions from worlds to sets of propositions (i.e. sets of sets of worlds). For
example, the modal base for the epistemic modal in (10) might be a function from a world w
to the set of propositions known by the speaker at w. The intersection of these propositions
forms what I will call the domain of the modal. The modal is then understood to quantify
over the worlds in this domain, where f is a parameter representing the modal base:
might φ is true at a context-modal base-world triple <c,f ,w> iff ∃w′ ∈ ⋂ f(w) : φ is
true at <c,f ,w′>.
This semantics tells us that might φ is true at a point of evaluation just in case the modal
domain at this point of evaluation contains a world at which φ is true. Put simply: the
modal claim describes φ as compatible with the relevant information.
The ordering source plays a different role, one that is most frequently discussed in con-
nection with modals expressings preferences, or characterizing how things stand with rules,
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or goals. The ordering source functions to determine a set of propositions that induces a
ranking of worlds. Consider a deontic modal claim:
(16) You must pay your taxes by April 15.
The ordering source here might be a function from a world to the propositions specifying
the tax law in some relevant country at that world. These propositions will determine a
ranking on worlds: worlds are more ideal the more propositions they make true. In our
present example, worlds are more ideal the more laws are followed in these worlds. (16) then
describes the best of these worlds as all being worlds at which you pay your taxes by April
15.13
Kratzer uses variations in the type of modal base and ordering source to give truth-
conditions for a variety of different modals and different readings of one and the same modal.
But what unites these semantics is the common core on which each modal characterizes how
things stand with relevant bodies of information.
This information-describing semantics plays one further role that will be crucial for my
discussion of reason claims. On the standard picture of modals like “ought”, “might”, and
“must”, the information they characterize can be specified in two different ways. As we saw
with (10) and (16), modalized sentences often do not explicitly state the information that the
sentence is characterizing. Here the information must somehow be gleaned from the larger
context of use. However, there are also modalized sentences where the relevant information
is made explicit. Devices for making the information explicit are known as “restrictors”.
Here is one example:
(17) According to weather report, it might rain tonight.
In (17), the modal “might” characterizes how things stand with the information contained
in the weather report: the sentence is true just in case the information in the report is
compatible with rain. It is also widely held that conditional antecedents can restrict modal
domains:14
13I am passing over various complications. See Portner (2009) for a more detailed overview of Kratzer’s
semantics.
14Again, the canonical source here is Kratzer. See Kratzer (1991a).
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(18) If you haven’t heard back from the doctor yet, then the test was probably negative.
Here the modal “probably” describes the information that you haven’t heard from the doctor
as making it likely that the test result is negative.
In (18), the antecedent restricts the domain of an explicit modal in the consequent. But
it is often thought that all conditionals have a modal in the consequent, either explicit, tacit,
or sometimes even both. For example:
(19) If it’s raining, then the streets are wet.
This sentence is typically thought to contain a tacit epistemic necessity modal with wide
scope over the consequent. That is, the real structure of (19) is better represented as follows:
(20) If it’s raining, then it must be that the streets are wet.
If all conditionals include such a modal in the consequent, then one might hold, as many do,
that the function of conditional antecedents just is to restrict modal domains.15
With this background in place, I can state more precisely what I aim to establish in this
chapter: reason claims characterize relevant bodies of information in the same manner as
familiar modals. This is not just to say that reason claims fall within the general category
of modality. I am advancing a substantive thesis that places the language of reasons within
a very specific linguistic category.
In sum, I aim to defend what I will call the Modal Model:
The Modal Model: Reason claims fall under the linguistic category of modality: they
describe how things stand with relevant bodies of information, where the relevant infor-
mation is determined by the same linguistic mechanisms that govern the interpretation
of modals like “ought”, “might”, and “must”.
15Again, see Kratzer (1991a).
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2.4 GROUNDS FOR THE MODAL MODEL
I offer two main arguments for the Modal Model. On the first, I argue that reason claims
engage with restrictors in the characteristic manner of modals. On the second, I argue that
reason claims display the characteristic behavior of modals when no restrictor is present to
settle the relevant body of information.
2.4.1 Reasons With Restrictors
Reason claims readily embed under restrictors. I focus here on restriction via conditional
antecedents:
(21) If Jake cheats once, there’s every reason to believe he’ll do it again.
(22) If Jake cheats once, he’ll probably do it again.
(23) If it’s going to rain tonight, then you have no reason to bother washing the car now.
(24) If it’s going to rain tonight, then you shouldn’t bother washing the car now.
(25) If the drugs were planted, then the fact that they were found in Pete’s car is not a
reason to believe that he’s a trafficker.16
(26) If the drugs were planted, then the fact that they were found in Pete’s car does not
make it likely that he’s a trafficker.
Each pair of sentences appears to have roughly the same meaning: the consequent charac-
terizes how things stand with the information contained in the antecedent. That is, (21)
describes the information that a person has cheated once as constituting strong grounds for
thinking they’ll do it again, while (22) describes this information as making it likely that
they’ll cheat again. Similarly, (23) and (24) characterize the information that it’s going
to rain as undermining any grounds for washing the car now. (25) and (26) describe the
relational claims in the consequent as being true relative to the body of information in the
antecedent.
16Kotzen (ms.) discusses similar cases and uses them to motivate a modal semantics for relational reason
claims. Henning (2014) offers a similar semantics motivated by data I discuss in the next section.
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The point here is not just that these conditionals appear to have the same meaning.
We can also give an argument for the claim that conditionals restrict the domains of reason
claims that parallels the standard “no scope” argument for taking conditionals to restrict
modal domains.17
Suppose the conditional is a two-place operator, either the material conditional or the
strict conditional. This operator must either scope above a reason claim or below a reason
claim. But neither option yields the right predictions.
Recall (21):
(21) If Jake cheats once, there’s every reason to believe he’ll do it again.
Suppose the conditional is a material conditional with wide scope over the reason claim.
This semantics wrongly predicts that (21) is true if cheating once has no correlation to
cheating again but Jake never cheats. Suppose instead that the reason claim scopes over the
conditional, i.e. the logical form (21) is really represented by (27):
(27) There is every reason to believe that if Jake cheats once, he’ll do it again.
This sentence is mistakenly predicted to be true if cheating once has no correlation to cheating
again but there is every reason to believe that Jake will never cheat.
Suppose instead that the conditional is a strict conditional with wide scope over the
reason claim. (21) now claims that every world (or every epistemically accessible world) in
which Jake cheats once is a world where there is reason to believe that Jake will cheat again.
But this seems too strong. Just consider a world where Jakes cheats once but the speaker is
unaware of this fact. There is a reading of the reason claim where it is true in this scenario
that there is no reason to believe Jake will cheat again because there is no reason to believe
Jake has cheated in the first place. Finally, suppose the strict conditional scopes below the
reason claim, as in (27). The resulting truth-conditions are again too strong: there might
be no reason at all for thinking that every epistemically accessible world where Jakes cheats
once is a world where he cheats again.
All of these problems are avoided if we take reason claims themselves to be inherently
relational: reason claims tell us how things stand with some relevant body of information
17See von Fintel and Heim (ms.) for an example of the latter.
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that can be provided explicitly by a conditional antecedent. On this semantics, there is no
two-place conditional operator, there is only a relational reason claim, one of whose relata—
here a body of information—can be given by a conditional antecedent. This semantics
bypasses the problems of the material conditional analysis since the falsity of the antecedent
no longer verifies the entire conditional. The truth of the conditional turns on the relation
between the information contained in the antecedent and the proposition in the scope of the
reason claim, e.g. the truth of (21) turns on whether the fact that Jake has cheated once
counts in favor of thinking he’ll cheat again. The restrictor semantics bypasses the problems
of the strict conditional analysis since the reason claim in (21) is evaluated only given the
information contained in the antecedent. Nothing follows about what there is reason to
believe in worlds where the antecedent is merely true. The restrictor semantics thus allows
for the possibility of scenarios where Jakes cheats once but there is no reason to believe he’ll
cheat again. These will just be scenarios in which the reason claim is not evaluated with
respect to the information that Jake has cheated once. Such scenarios are entirely consistent
with the truth of (21), as the latter explicitly supplies the information that Jake has cheated
as the information in light of which the reason claim is assessed.
These considerations are suggestive but not decisive. I suspect that many will object
that the restrictors in our examples with reasons are actually restricting a tacit modal in
the consequent, such as “must” or “will”. In other words, perhaps the examples do pro-
vide evidence for the restrictor analysis of conditionals. But the examples just involve the
restriction of modal domains, not the domains of reason claims themselves.
However, it’s doubtful that these strategies can explain the data in every case. Take
(21) and (23). Both are naturally construed as holding right now, given the truth of the
antecedent. That is, if Jake cheats, then given this fact, there is right now every reason to
believe he’ll do it again. The sentence has no reading on which it specifies how things stand
at some interdeterminate future time. It’s therefore implausible that the sentence contains
a tacit modal “will” that scopes over the consequent.
There is also data that speaks against the presence of a tacit epistemic necessity modal,
“must”, but it will take more work to set out these cases. The data here concerns the role
of reason claims in arguments that appear to invalidate classically valid inference patterns.
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As background to these cases, consider the so-called Miner’s Paradox:
Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A or in shaft B, but we do not know which. Flood
waters threaten to flood the shafts. We have enough sandbags to block one shaft, but
not both. If we block one shaft, all the water will go into the other shaft, killing any
miners inside it. If we block neither shaft, both shafts will fill halfway with water, and
just one miner, the lowest in the shaft, will be killed (Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010,
115)).
Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) note that the following all seem true in the above scenario:
P1. We ought to block neither shaft.
P2. If the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block shaft A.
P3. If the miners are in shaft B, we ought to block shaft B.
And the following is true by hypothesis:
P4. Either the miners are in shaft A, or the miners are in shaft B.
From P1–P4 we can derive the following conclusion by Disjunction Elimination, Modus
Ponens, and Disjunction Introduction:
C. Either we ought to block shaft A, or we ought to block shaft B.
But C is inconsistent with P1: if we ought to block one of the shafts, then it’s false that we
ought to block neither shaft.
Kolodny and MacFarlane argue that the solution to this paradox lies in rejecting Modus
Ponens: this rule of inference is not generally valid and the above constitutes a counterex-
ample.
Consider P2. Kolodny and MacFarlane claim that the antecedent directly restricts the
domain of the modal in the consequent. The modal thus describes blocking shaft A as the
best course of action given the information that the miners are in shaft A.18 Now suppose
that as a matter of fact, the miners are in shaft A. It does not follow that we ought to block
18This proposal requires a non-trivial departure from Kratzer’s semantics for deontic modals discussed
above. See Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) and Cariani, Kaufmann and Kaufmann (2013) for discussion.
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shaft A, since this modal claim does not necessarily characterize what we should do in light
of the information about the miners’ actual location. The conditional antecedent forces the
modal in the consequent of P2 to characterize this further information. But if the modal is
not in the scope of this restrictor, then it may well characterize some completely different
body of information—one that need not make blocking shaft A the best course of action.
This is how P2 and its antecedent can both be true without the consequent itself necessarily
being true.19
We can construct a similar paradox involving reason claims.20 Suppose again that the
miners are either all in shaft A or all in shaft B, and we don’t know which. But suppose
instead that we have enough sandbags to block both shafts—although the sandbags are very
heavy, so we’d prefer not to move them unless it is absolutely necessary.
In this scenario, the following seems true:
P1. There is reason to block shaft A, and there is reason to block shaft B.
Were we to block only one shaft or fail to block either, we would be properly criticized on
the grounds that there was every reason to block both. This is true regardless of whether
we happened to block the right shaft and save all of the miners.
The following also seem true:
P2. If the miners are in shaft A, then there’s no reason to block shaft B.
P3. If the miners are in shaft B, then there’s no reason to block shaft A.
Both claims seem perfectly obvious in the context of deliberation about what to do.
Finally, recall our original assumption:
P4. Either the miners are in shaft A, or the miners are in shaft B.
From P1–P4 we can derive the following conclusion by Disjunction Elimination, Modus
Ponens, and Disjunction Introduction:
19See Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) for discussion of various objections one might raise against this
proposal.
20The case to follow is different from Kolodny and MacFarlane’s in several respects, as will become clear
below. I have chosen to modify the case so as to avoid using the awkward phrasing of “most reason” in place
of “ought”. See Henning (2014) for discussion of a case involving the “most reason” locution.
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C. Either there’s no reason to block shaft A, or there’s no reason to block shaft B.
However, C is inconsistent with P1: it is a basic fact about the logic of reasons that there’s
no reason to φ entails the negation of there is reason to φ. So if one of the shafts is such
that there is no reason to block it, then it cannot be the case that there is reason to block
shaft A and reason to block shaft B.
Again, this data is not decisive. But it constitutes a strong case for thinking that reason
claims have domains that can be restricted directly by conditional antecedents. Consider:
(i) If the miners are in shaft A, then there’s no reason to block shaft B.
(ii) The miners are in shaft A.
(iii) There’s no reason to block shaft B.
Suppose the antecedent of (i) directly restricts the domain of the reason claim in the con-
sequent. That is, the reason claim describes the information that the miners are shaft A as
undermining any grounds for blocking shaft B. Now suppose that the miners are in shaft A.
It does not follow that there is no reason to block shaft B, since the latter reason claim is not
within the scope of a restrictor. That is, (iii) may well be characterizing how things stand
with some different body of information that does constitute reason to block shaft B, and so
the reason claim may well be false. Notice a crucial feature of this case: if there is a tacit
epistemic necessity modal in the consequent of (i) that is restricted by the antecedent, then
the inference to (iii) will be valid.21 But it isn’t.22 So the antecedent restricts the reason
claim directly.
Willer (2012) pursues an alternative strategy for resolving the original Miner’s Paradox.
He presents a semantics on which Modus Ponens is valid, but Disjunction Elimination is
not. However, his semantics still invalidates Modus Tollens. Consider, then, how one might
employ his semantics to resolve our puzzle about reasons. Take the following inference:
21Suppose there is a tacit epistemic necessity modal in the consequent restricted by the antecedent. (i)
will then express the following proposition: every epistemically accessible world in which the miners are in
shaft A is a world in which there is no reason to block shaft B. Hence, if we’re in a world where the miners
are in shaft A, then we must be in a world where there’s no reason to block shaft B (I make the standard
assumption that the actual world is always epistemically accessible).
22Note: one must take care not to confuse the above inference with an inference in which one draws the
conclusion on the basis of knowledge of the premises. The latter is perfectly valid even if Modus Ponens is
not. See Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010) for discussion.
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(a) If the miners are in shaft A, then there’s no reason to block shaft B.
(b) There is reason to block shaft B.
(c) The miners are not in shaft A.
(a) and (b) seem true in our above scenario, even though the conclusion (c) does not in-
tuitively follow. These judgments support a semantics like Willer’s that invalidates Modus
Tollens. However, notice again what would happen if the antecedent of (a) were restricting
the domain of a tacit epistemic necessity modal with wide scope over the consequent: the
inference to (c) would be vaild.23 But it isn’t. So in general: if one wishes to resolve our
paradox about reasons by denying the validity of some classically valid inference pattern,
then one must take conditional antecedents to restrict the domain of reason claims directly.
2.4.2 Reasons Without Restrictors
As we noted in §2.3, modals often appear without restrictors that explicitly specific which
information is relevant. Such modals are known as “bare modals”. Data about bare modals
has been the topic of much recent discussion, as it presents various foundational challenges
to a simple, contextualist picture of the semantics of modals.24 I will not take sides in this
dispute. I simply aim to show that “bare” reason claims give rise to a parallel set of data
and that this motivates a structurally parallel semantics.
The puzzle begins from the observation that epistemic modal talk does not behave as
one would expect if it simply describes what the speaker knows. Here is an early example
from Huw Price:
If I disagree with your claim that it is probably going to snow, I am not disagreeing
that given your evidence it is likely that this is so; but indicating what follows from my
23Suppose there is a tacit epistemic necessity modal in the consequent restricted by the antecedent. (i)
will then express the following proposition: every epistemically accessible world in which the miners are in
shaft A is a world in which there is no reason to block shaft B. Hence, if we’re in a world where there is
reason to block shaft B, then we cannot be in a world where the miners are in shaft A.
24See, for instance, Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson (2005), Egan (2007), Dowell (2011), von Fintel and
Gillies (2011), Khoo (2015), MacFarlane (2011, 2014), Moss (2013, 2015), Rothschild (2012), Swanson (2006,
2011, 2016), Willer (2013), Yalcin (2007, 2010, 2011, 2012a,b), and Yanovich (2014).
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evidence. Indeed, I might agree that it is probably going to snow and yet think it false
that this follows from your evidence (Price (1983, 404); his emphasis).
The initial problem is straightforward. If “it’s probably going to snow” just means “My
evidence suggests it’s likely to snow”, then it’s not clear why a more informed listener might
take herself to disagree with a speaker’s probability claim. After all, she need not disagree
that the speaker’s evidence suggests that it’s likely to snow. Conversely, a more informed
listener might take herself to agree with what the speaker said but disagree that the speaker’s
evidence suggests that it’s likely to snow. A natural suggestion is to take the speaker’s claim
to instead characterize how things stand with the evidence available to some larger group.
But it then becomes unclear why the speaker was warranted in making her assertion in the
first place.
My aim is not to canvass the various attempts to solve this puzzle. I only aim to show
that reason claims present the very same challenge. Suppose you have a friend who believes
he can predict the weather by harnessing the power of crystal skulls. He comes to you one
day and asserts the following:
(28) There is good reason to believe that a major storm is headed this way.
If you’ve already checked the weather report, and meteorologists are also predicting a storm,
then there’s clearly some sense in which you and your friend agree. And this can be so
regardless of the fact that you take your friend’s “evidence” to be completely irrelevant to
whether a storm is going to occur.
Here is a parallel case involving disagreement. Suppose Jones is a fine, up-standing
citizen who happens to live in a town where a murder has just occurred. Someone might
remark:
(29) There’s no reason to believe that Jones was involved.
But suppose the police have just learned that Jones’s blood was found on the murder weapon.
If they overhear (29), they might reply:
(30) Actually, there is: we just found his blood on the murder weapon.
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This use of “actually” typically functions to signal disagreement.25 But of course, the police
might agree that the initial speaker had no evidence for thinking Jones was involved.26
So far I’ve been focusing on intuitions about bare reason existentials. But we can elicit
the same type of intuitions with bare relational reason claims and bare possessive reason
claims. For example, suppose the police find large quantities of narcotics in Pete’s vehicle.
A detective might assert the following:
(31) We have every reason to believe that Pete is a drug trafficker.
But if you’ve just learned that the drugs were planted, you can reply:
(32) No you don’t—the drugs were planted!
Similarly, if someone says:
(33) The fact that drugs were found in Pete’s car is a reason to believe he’s a trafficker.
You can reply:
(34) No it isn’t—the drugs were planted!
None of this should be surprising if reasons claims characterize relevant bodies of information.
If the relevant information is not specified explicitly, then it must be settled in some fashion
by the context of use or perhaps left open as a further parameter of evaluation. It is not
straightforward how any of this works in the case of familiar modals. But if we recognize a
25Compare:
A: I’m not hungry.
B: # Actually, I am.
B’s reply sounds bizarre if it’s read with the kind of intonation we naturally place on the phrase given in the
main text: “Actually, there is.” In particular, one should make sure not to place focal stress on the word
“I”. A simple explanation of the infelicity of B’s reply is that “actually” signals disagreement, but what B
said does not conflict with what A said.
26Agreement and disagreement intuitions are not entirely straightforward. Some speakers judge the pur-
ported cases of disagreement as instances of two people talking past one another. However, the same goes
for intuitions about eavesdropping scenarios concerning epistemic modals. Some theorists even hold that
the relevant datum is just that two readings are available, one involving disagreement and one not (see, for
example, von Fintel and Gillies (2011)). The data about reason-talk plausibly involves the very same kind
of variability, which provides further evidence for the parallelism between reason-talk and modal-talk.
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parallel semantics for reasons, we are a least in a position to give these problems a unified
resolution.27
To sum up: We’ve seen that reason claims give rise to the characteristic behavior of
modal claims in a variety of different cases, both with and without restrictors. The types of
cases at issue have been the focus of extensive discussion in the recent literature on modals,
with numerous authors claiming that these cases reveal distinctive features of the semantics
of modals. The Modal Model offers a simple explanation for all of these parallels: reason
claims characterize relevant bodies of information in the very same manner as modals.
2.5 COMPOSITIONAL SEMANTICS
I conclude with a brief sketch of the compositional semantics of reasons. My aim here is to
set out the general shape that such a semantics should take and to show that the Modal
Model can be made precise with the tools of formal semantics.
Now, I have emphasized from the start of this dissertation that we must distinguish
between the semantics of reasons and the more familiar investigation into metaphysics of
reasons that has been the main focus of philosophers in the past several decades. However,
it turns out that the latter investigation has identified precisely the sort structure we need
to give a semantics for ordinary language talk of reasons.
T.M. Scanlon’s account of the reason-for relation will provide the framework for my
semantics. Here is how he characterizes the reason-for relation:
“is a reason for” is a four-place relation, R(p, x, c, a), holding between a fact p, an agent
x, a set of conditions c, and an action or attitude a. This is the relation that holds just
in case p is a reason for a person x in situation c to do or hold a (Scanlon (2014, 31)).
Let me take each relatum in turn, first explaining its role in a semantics for reasons, and
then turning later to give a fully compositional semantics for reason claims.
27See Chapter 3 for further discussion.
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Start with the relatum p. p is itself the reason. As Scanlon puts it elsewhere, reasons
are things that count in favor of acts or attitudes.28 So p is the thing that counts in favor of
these acts or attitudes. The other relata specify what p counts in favor of, for whom, and in
what circumstances.
Now, Scanlon takes p to simply be a fact. I will not adopt this assumption in my
semantics. However, my proposal is similar: the things that we talk about when we talk
about reasons are propositions, sets of propositions, or mereological sums of propositions.
Some of these propositions may be true at the world of evaluation, and so they are facts, as
Scanlon says. But I wish to leave open the possibility that some of our talk of reasons may
refer to falsehoods, on the one hand, and knowledge on the other. That is, natural language
talk of reasons is not simply talk of facts.29
Continuing, on Scanlon’s metaphysics, a reason is always a reason for something, for
someone, and in some circumstances. Each of the preceding plays a separate role in my
semantics. Consider a relational reason claim:
• φ is a reason to believe that ψ.
If a sentence of this form is true, then φ must be a reason: in a simple case, it will be a
proposition. But it can’t just be any proposition. It must be a proposition that counts as a
reason to believe that ψ.
Let’s take apart the meaning of the infinitive phrase to believe that ψ. The attitude verb
“believe” plays the role of Scanlon’s relatum a: the verb specifies what general type of act
or attitude the reason is a reason for. Scanlon’s person x appears covertly. Infinitive phrases
like to believe that ψ are standardly thought to contain a hidden pronoun, known as PRO.
The referent of this pronoun is the agent who does the believing—here, the agent for whom
the reason is a reason to believe that ψ. It is often thought that a reason for belief is a reason
for anyone to hold the given belief.30 So we should allow that PRO can refer to some generic
subject x. Claims about reasons for action work differently: the very same proposition will
28See Scanlon (1998, Chapter 1).
29See Chapter 3 for arguments that talk of reasons for belief describes information connected to thinkers’




often count as a reason for one person to perform an action but not another. For example,
if one person likes dancing but another does not, then the fact that a party will involve
dancing is a reason for the first person to go but not the second.31 We should allow, then,
that the referent of PRO can pick out a particular subject for whom dancing is a reason to
go to the party.
I wish to remain neutral on how exactly the referent of PRO is determined in a given
case. One might hold that PRO’s referent is settled by the context of use. But one might also
allow that PRO’s value is fixed grammatically—i.e. “controlled”—by some other element of
the discourse. There may even be cases where PRO is bound by a quantifier, as in (35):
(35) Everyone has a reason to go to the party.
This sentence describes the party as being such that there is a reason for each individual
person to attend, i.e. the party contains something for everyone.
Now, as Scanlon emphasizes, a proposition may count as such a reason in one set of
circumstances but not another even when we hold fixed who the reason is a reason for.
We’ve already seen one example of this phenomenon when we discussed relational reason
claims embedded under conditionals:
(36) If the drugs were planted, then the fact that they were found in Pete’s car is not a
reason to believe that he’s a trafficker.
Ordinarily, the fact that drugs were found in Pete’s car is a reason to believe that he’s a
drug trafficker. But not so in circumstances where the drugs were planted. The role of the
conditional antecedent in (36) is to make explicit what the relevant circumstances are for the
evaluation of the reason claim in the consequent. That is, the conditional antecedent shifts
the relevant circumstances so that they include the information in the antecedent. This is
why (36) sounds true. This type of circumstance-relativity is the first element of the modal
meaning of reason claims: relevant circumstances constitute a body of information, so reason
claims characterize bodies of information along at least one dimension. We have, then, the
following truth-conditions for relational reason claims:
31This example comes from Schroeder (2008).
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(a) φ is a reason to ψ is true at a world-circumstance pair <w,c> iff φ is a reason for JPROK
to ψ at w in c.
(b) φ is reason to ψ is true at <w,c> iff φ is reason for JPROK to ψ at w in c.
(a) gives the truth-conditions for a count noun relational reason claim: is a reason to ψ
determines a property of propositions that is predicated of φ. (b) gives the truth-conditions
for a mass noun relational reason claim: is reason to ψ determines a property of either
some set of propositions, the intersection of this set, or perhaps the mereological sum of the
members of this set. The choice here will be determined by the semantics of mass nouns in
general.
Now, so far I’ve only discussed the semantics of relational reason claims, wherein the
reason—φ—is specified explcitly even if no restrictor is present. But bare reason existentials
and bare possessive reason claims fail to state which proposition counts as the reason:
• there is (a) reason to φ
• S has (a) reason to φ
I propose that in cases like these, the reason is given by a modal base f . The value of this
function at a world will be a set of propositions. We can take the intersection of this set to
provide the proposition that constitutes the reason (again, in the case of mass noun reason
claims, we might instead treat the entire set or perhaps the mereological sum of the members
of the set as constituting reason).
This proposal easily accommodates the phenomenon whereby conditional antecedents re-
strict the domain of reason claims: the domain is simply given by the intersection of the value
of the modal base at the world of evaluation, and conditional antecedents shift the parameter
f to the include the information in the antecedent, as on Kratzer’s original semantics. This
proposal also accommodates the variability in reason claims without restrictors: there may
be no unique value for f in a typical context of use, which may give rise to the puzzling
intuitions discussed in §2.4.2.32 The modal base f is thus the second modal element in our
semantics for reasons.
32See Chapter 3 for the details of this explanation.
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Let me say more about the particular role that f plays in our semantics. I will take
reason existentials to contain quantifiers that directly engage with the modal base f :
(a) there is a reason to φ is true at <w,f ,c> iff ∃p ∈ f(w) : p is a reason for JPROK to φ at
w in c.
(b) there is reason to φ is true at <w,f ,c> iff ∃p = ⋂ f(w) : p is a reason for JPROK to φ at
w in c.
(a) corresponds to the natural reading of the count noun reason existential on which it
characterizes how things stand with at least one piece of the relevant information. (b) corre-
sponds to the natural reading of the mass noun reason existential on which it characterizes
how things stand with the entire body of relevant information.
Possessive reason claims can receive identical readings when the subject S is the speaker.
For example, there is little difference between (37) and (38):
(37) There is reason to believe that Jones is the murderer.
(38) I have reason to believe that Jones is the murderer.
However, when S is someone other than the speaker, it’s natural to hear the sentence as
characterizing how things stand with S’s information:
(39) John has reason to believe that I’m the murderer.
This sentence has a reading on which it is true even if the speaker knows that she is not a
murderer. It is a further question how phrases like “John has” yield this reading. I leave
this as an issue for future research.
To recap: I’ve offered a semantics for reasons that employs three key elements—the
hidden pronoun PRO, the modal base parameter f , and the circumstance parameter c. It is
important to see why all three elements are needed. It is true that a single, centered world
will contain exactly the same information as our set of three elements. But the problem
with a centered world-based semantics is that we need to be able to shift each element
independently. As we’ve seen above, conditionals sometimes change the body of information
that constitutes the reason (see (40) below), but they can also leave the reason unchanged
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while varying the set of circumstances in which the reason is evaluated as a reason (see (41)
below).
(40) If there are drugs found in Pete’s car, then there is reason to believe that he is a
trafficker.
(41) If the drugs were planted, then the fact that they were found in Pete’s car is not a
reason to believe that he’s a trafficker.
We’ve also seen that talk of what someone has reason to believe/do can shift either the value
of PRO or the modal base parameter. For example, suppose you know that an assassin is
about to target Bill in his office but Bill is unaware of this. The following seems true:
(42) Bill has a reason to leave the building even though he doesn’t realize it.
Here the modal base contains the information known to the speaker; the modal base is not
restricted to Bill’s information. The locution “Bill has” functions to change the value of
PRO: Bill is the one for whom the information about the assassin is a reason to leave the
building. A centered world-based semantics makes the wrong predictions about this case.
Such a semantics guarantees that the relevant information and the agent for whom that
information is a reason are always given by one single individual—namely, the center in the
relevant centered world. But (42) shows that the relevant information state can sometimes
be tied to one individual, while the relevant agent is a completely different person.
Now, what I’ve set out so far is only a general sketch of the semantics of reasons. I have
not specified that in virtue of which any particular proposition counts as a reason for an
act or attitude. How—or even whether—to give a more informative semantics is a difficult
question that I cannot discuss in detail here. Scanlon takes the reason-for relation to be
primitive, and so he would deny that a more informative semantics is possible. Others have
argued in favor of a reductive account of this relation.33 There is also a middle ground
position wherein one supplies some additional structure to the relation without offering a
completely reductive semantics. But these are topics for another occasion.
Still, there is one final item on our agenda for this chapter. I’ve set out a proposal for the
general truth-conditions of the language of reasons, but it remains to be seen how exactly
33See Finlay (2014).
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this proposal can be implemented compositionally. I will close with some brief remarks on
how one might carry out this task.
The output of the composition process is already settled by the truth-conditions given
above: a reason claim determines a function from world-modal base-circumstance triples to
truth-values.34 Let us work backwards to determine the denotations of the elements of the
reason claim. I said above that in the simplest case, reasons will be propositions. So a
phrase like is (a) reason to φ should denote a property of propositions: that is, a function
from propositions to functions from world-modal base-circumstance triples to truth-values.
The general structure of this function is implicit in the truth-conditions I gave above for the
various types of reason claims. The particular function denoted by is (a) reason to φ will be
settled by the referent of the hidden pronoun PRO and the infinitive phrase to φ. However,
it is a vexed question what denotation we should assign to the word to and the resulting
infinitive phrase. For now, we will have to rely on a placeholder: let us take the phrase PRO
to φ to denote a proposition—i.e. a function from worlds to truth-values. In particular, we
can take the phrase to denote the function from a world w that returns truth iff the referent
of PRO φ’s in w. The end result is the following denotation for the word “reason”: the
semantic value of this word is a function from propositions to functions from propositions to
functions from world-modal base-circumstance triples to truth-values.
34I leave open the role of the context coordinate of the index. Perhaps it settles the value of the modal base
parameter. Or perhaps the value of this parameter is left open, to be settled by the context of assessment.
See Chapter 3 for discussion.
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3.0 THE SEMANTICS OF EPISTEMIC REASONS AND EPISTEMIC
MODALS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Suppose the head of NASA calls a press conference and announces the following:
(1) There is reason to believe that a large asteroid is headed on a collision course with the
Earth.
The public’s behavior will change dramatically. Why? A simple answer is that (1) conveys
a non-trivial degree of confidence in an asteroid’s hitting the Earth. But of course, (1) does
not convey certainty or near certainty that the asteroid will hit. The claim conveys a far
weaker but still significant degree of confidence.
Sentence (1) has the following general form:
There is (every/good/little/no) reason to believe that φ
Call sentences with this form “epistemic reason claims”, or “reason claims” for short. As
we just saw with (1), reason claims are important. Their significance is even enshrined as
a matter of U.S. law, with the Supreme Court holding that the police may lawfully enter a
suspect’s home only “when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”1 It’s hard to
1See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) at p. 603. See Rabasca (2012) for discussion of subsequent
disputes over how to interpret the Court’s “reason to believe” standard. Philosophers and lawyers aren’t the
only ones who talk about what there is reason to believe. The Corpus of Contemporary American English
yields 864 unique results for There ’s/is (every/good/little/no) reason to believe/think. And the phrase
reason to believe is in fact the most frequently occurring of all reason to [verb] constructions. Relational
reason claims—i.e. claims of the form φ is a reason to believe that ψ—turn out to be extremely rare,
even though these constructions are probably the most commonly discussed epistemic reason claims among
philosophers. The corpus lists 9 results for is (not) a (good) reason to believe/think, only 3 of which are
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understand the importance we place on reason claims if they convey no degree of confidence
in a proposition’s truth. And yet the degree of confidence they do convey falls well short
of certainty. The upshot is that reason claims are part of what has become known as the
“language of subjective uncertainty”(Swanson, 2011).
Debates about the semantics of this language have occupied center stage in much recent
literature. Numerous authors claim that traditional semantics fails to capture the commu-
nication of subjective uncertainty, and proposals for accommodating such communication
range from expressivism, to relativism, to non-standard versions of contextualism.2
To date, this research has focused almost exclusively on the semantics of epistemic
modals, or what I will call “modal claims” for short—e.g. sentences of the form it is likely
that φ, it is probable that φ, or it might be that φ. But as we’ve just seen: reason claims
convey uncertainty as well. However, once we locate reason claims within the language of
subjective uncertainty, questions immediately arise: What is the relation between the mean-
ing of reason claims and the meaning of modal claims? What parallels, if any, exist between
the semantics of these two types of expressions?
In this paper, I argue that there are strong ties between reason claims and modal claims
that raise a puzzle about the semantics of epistemic reasons. And I argue that this puzzle
ultimately transforms our understanding of the meaning of epistemic modals.
The puzzle stems from the fact that reason claims exhibit the characteristic behavior of
modal claims in so-called eavesdropping scenarios—that is, scenarios in which an utterance
is assessed by a third party with different information than the one who originally made the
claim. The eavesdropping data about modal claims has been a driving force behind many
of the recent proposals about the distinctive semantics of epistemic modals.3 The parallel
data about reason claims suggests they will have some kind of structurally similar semantics.
relational reason claims (corpus last accessed June 25, 2017). Finally, the language of epistemic reasons is
not unique to English. Native speakers of Cantonese, Dutch, German, Italian, and Spanish confirm that
these languages contain roughly synonymous expressions.
2See, for instance, Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson (2005), Egan (2007), von Fintel and Gillies (2011),
MacFarlane (2011, 2014), Moss (2013, 2015), Rothschild (2012), Swanson (2006, 2011, 2016), Willer (2013),
and Yalcin (2007, 2010, 2011, 2012a,b).
3See, for instance, Dowell (2011), Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson (2005), Egan (2007), von Fintel and
Gillies (2011), Hawthorne (2007), Khoo (2015), MacFarlane (2011, 2014), Willer (2013), Yalcin (2011), and
Yanovich (2014).
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However, it turns out that reason claims “embed” differently than modal claims: each type of
expression behaves differently when placed in certain complex sentences. And this difference
in embedding behavior reveals that none of the leading semantics for modal claims can be
extended to reason claims.
Put simply, then, the puzzle is this: What is the semantics of epistemic reasons? The
similarities with modal claims call out for a shared semantics. But the differences appear
to show that a shared semantics cannot be had. I argue that the solution to this puzzle lies
in re-thinking the semantics of epistemic modals. On the canonical semantics for epistemic
modals, tracing back at least to G.E. Moore (1962), modal claims describe how things stand
with bodies of knowledge. However, I will argue that it is in fact reason claims, not modal
claims, that describe knowledge. The function of modal claims is instead to describe how
things stand with the relevant truths, where there is no requirement that these truths be
known or otherwise related to anyone’s epistemic state.
This is a surprising result, for it means that the semantics of epistemic reasons actually
pressures us to revise widely held views about the semantics of epistemic modals. But the
payoff is clear: the theory I offer enables us to give a unified account of the language of
subjective uncertainty that allows for divergence among the particular fragments of this
language. On my view, reason and modal claims share an underlying semantics on which
both expressions characterize relevant bodies of information, and this structural similarity
explains the shared eavesdropping data. Nevertheless, each expression differs in which type
of information it characterizes—knowledge vs. mere truths—and this difference explains the
divergence in embedding data. I close by reflecting on the larger consequences of this theory.
I argue that the semantics of epistemic reasons ultimately helps us understand our concept
of an epistemic reason.
3.2 THE DATA
I begin by setting out two new sets of data concerning the relation between reason claims and
modal claims. As we’ll see, the parallels in eavesdropping data suggest that these expressions
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have some type of shared semantics, but the differences in embedding data rule out extending
the leading semantics for modal claims to reason claims.
3.2.1 Eavesdropping Data
Suppose Pete’s vehicle has been stopped and found to contain large quantities of narcotics.
He is arrested and jailed pending a hearing that will determine his bail. At the hearing, the
District Attorney reviews the facts of Pete’s arrest and asserts the following sentence:
(2) There is good reason to believe that Pete is a drug trafficker.
There are two ways the conversation can proceed from here.
Scenario #1: Detective Barnes conducts a raid on Pete’s home and discovers additional
narcotics. She arrives at the hearing and presents additional testimony on behalf of the
prosecution. Barnes remarks, “I agree with the DA.” Or: “What the DA said is true.”
In general terms, Barnes accepts the DA’s assertion.
Scenario #2: Barnes has just discovered that, unbeknownst to the DA, the drugs found
in Pete’s vehicle were planted by a corrupt cop with a personal vendetta against Pete.
Barnes rushes to the hearing only to arrive when the DA asserts (2). Barnes replies,
“No there isn’t—the drugs were planted!” Or: “That’s false!” In general terms, Barnes
rejects the DA’s assertion.
Any adequate semantics for reason claims should enable us to explain why the conversation
can proceed in these two ways. However, this constraint turns out to be surprisingly difficult
to satisfy.
Consider a simple, contextualist semantics for reason claims: these expressions are
context-sensitive descriptions of how things stand with the speaker’s knowledge, on par with
sentences like “All of the evidence I’m aware of suggests that P.” This semantics explains
why reason claims are important: their significance lies in the significance of determining
how things stand with what one knows. And the semantics fits with the familiar theoretical
characterization of reasons for belief as items of knowledge.4
4See, for instance, Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), as well as Williamson’s (2000) related discussion of
the nature of evidence.
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However, this semantics makes it very mysterious why Scenario #2 is a perfectly appro-
priate continuation of the above conversation. If the semantics is correct, then by uttering
(2), the DA asserts that everything she is aware of suggests that Pete is a trafficker. And
surely this proposition is true. Even if Barnes learns the drugs were planted, she should not
dispute that what the DA knows suggests that Pete is a trafficker.5 So if the DA is simply
describing the state of her own body of knowledge, why is Barnes entitled to reject the DA’s
assertion?
One response is to modify our semantics so that reason claims describe how things stand
with the relevant group’s knowledge, where the group extends beyond the speaker. If Barnes
counts as part of the relevant group, then in Scenario #2, what the DA said is false, since
the group’s knowledge does not suggest that Pete is a trafficker. No wonder Barnes is entitled
to reject the DA’s assertion.
The trouble is that it now becomes mysterious why the DA was warranted in making
her assertion in the first place. The DA is not in a position to know how things stand
with the information available to Barnes, so how is the DA entitled to pronounce upon
the bearing of their pooled body of knowledge? One might object that the DA can make
reasonable assumptions about what Barnes knows. But note that anyone who learned the
drugs were planted could have appropriately rejected the DA’s assertion. And surely the
DA is not warranted in making assumptions about how things stand with everyone’s pooled
knowledge.
In general, the contextualist faces a dilemma: if reason claims describe the speaker’s
knowledge, these claims are easy to assert but too hard to dispute; alternatively, if reason
claims describe knowledge beyond the speaker’s grasp, these claims are easy to dispute but
too hard to assert.
The same type of dilemma has attracted a great deal of attention in the recent literature
on epistemic modals.6 Talk of what might be the case is often thought to describe how
things stand with the speaker’s knowledge: it might be that φ is true at a context just in
5If you are inclined to doubt this point, ask yourself: What can the DA say to defend her actions if it
later comes out that the drugs were planted? Answer: she can state, truthfully, that everything she knew
suggested that Pete was a trafficker.
6See the papers cited in n. 3.
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case what the speaker knows is compatible with φ.7 However, if I say that the keys might
be under the doormat, you can reject my assertion by saying “No, I already checked there.”
And you can reject my assertion while being perfectly aware of the fact that everything I
knew was consistent with the keys being under the doormat. As before, one might try to
accommodate this data by taking my assertion to describe our combined knowledge. But
again, this proposal makes it mysterious why I’m warranted in making my assertion in the
first place.
My aim in this paper is not to evaluate the many proposals that have been advanced to
account for such data (although there will be occasion to discuss some of these proposals in
§§3.3–3.4). My claim is simply the following: we should strive for a unified explanation of the
eavesdropping data about reason claims and modal claims. In both cases, we need to explain
how an eavesdropper is in a position to reject an assertion the speaker was nevertheless
warranted in making. Theorists have used such data to motivate a variety of proposals
about the distinctive semantics of epistemic modals. The parallel data about reason claims
suggests these expressions will have some kind of structurally similar semantics.
3.2.2 Embedding Data
Suppose Joe lives in a town where a murder has just occurred. The police have begun their
investigation, but so far they have no suspects. Compare:
(3) # Joe is the murderer, but he might not be the murderer.8
(4) # Joe is the murderer, but there’s no reason to believe he’s the murderer.
Both sentences are extremely odd things to assert. However, these sentences differ sharply
in their “embedding” behavior—i.e. they differ in how they contribute to complex sentences
of which they are a part. As Seth Yalcin (2007; 2011) observes, sentences like (3)—which he
calls “epistemic contradictions”—are also incoherent to entertain or merely imagine as true:
(5) # Suppose Joe is the murderer, but he might not be the murderer.
(6) # Imagine a scenario in which Joe is the murderer, but he might not be the murderer.
7See Stanley (2005) for one example of this semantics.
8I use “#” to mark sentences that are grammatical but infelicitous.
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But sentences like (4)—which I’ll call “reason contradictions”—embed just fine:
(7) Suppose Joe is the murderer, but there’s no reason to believe he’s the murderer.
(8) Imagine a scenario in which Joe is the murderer, but there’s no reason to believe he’s
the murderer.9
Here is a different pair of sentences that illustrates the same point:
(9) # Suppose your gas gauge is broken, but it might not be broken.
(10) Suppose your gas gauge is broken, but there’s no reason to believe it’s broken.
The second sentence sounds clearly better than the first.
The effect persists even if we add a bit of context immediately before giving the sentences:
John lives in a town where there has been an outbreak of a virus. Often times those
infected with the virus initially show no symptoms.
(11) # Imagine a scenario in which John is infected, but he might not be infected.
(12) Imagine a scenario in which John is infected, but there is no reason to believe he is
infected.
9cf. Skorupski (2010, 42): “[W]e take it for granted that there can be propositions that are true even
though there is no reason to believe that they are true.” Let me also add a few clarifications. I’ll refer to
sentences that exhibit any of the following forms as “reason contradictions”:
φ but there is no reason to believe that φ
φ but there is (every/good) reason to believe that not-φ
This terminology is not ideal since sentences exhibiting the first form do not have the form of contradictions
whose second conjunct is within the scope of an operator, as in Yalcin’s epistemic contradictions and our
second type of reason contradictions. But it will be convenient to have a single term to cover both of the
forms listed above, as both forms exhibit the same type of contrast with epistemic contradictions. Finally,
I make no claim that embedded epistemic contradictions are always infelicitous. It may be possible to
improve the felicity of these embeddings by adding certain contextual cues and reversing the order of the
conjuncts (see Dorr and Hawthorne (2013), Dowell (ms.), Moss (2015), Sorensen (2009), Willer (2013), and
Yanovich (2014)). Nevertheless, the fact that such maneuvers are needed in order to improve the felicity of
the embeddings illustrates the contrast between sentences like (5)/(6) vs. (7)/(8): the latter require no such
maneuvers in order to sound felicitous.
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3.3 THE PUZZLE
We’ve seen that reason claims give rise to the very type of eavesdropping data that motivates
a variety of proposals about the distinctive semantics of epistemic modals. We should thus
expect that reason claims have some type of structurally similar semantics. However, the
contrast in embedding data reveals that none of the leading semantics for modal claims can
be extended to reason claims. Let me explain.
3.3.1 Two Semantics for Modal Claims
There are two main approaches to the semantics of epistemic modals. On the first, which
I will call the Orthodox Semantics, modal claims express propositions concerning how
things stand with some contextually relevant epistemic state. We’ve already seen one version
of this theory above: it might be that φ is true at a context just in case what the speaker
knows is compatible with φ. On this semantics, if I say “it might rain tomorrow”, the
sentence expresses the proposition that everything I know leaves open the possibility of rain.
The Orthodox Semantics comes in many other varieties that differ as far as which type
of epistemic state is at issue—knowledge, certain knowledge, or evidence—as well as whose
epistemic state is at issue—the speaker’s, some group’s, or some larger epistemic state that
includes the information the speaker or group is in a position to know.10 But on all of these
semantics, modal claims just describe what the world is like by describing how things stand
with people’s epistemic states: it might be that φ describes the world as being such that the
contextually relevant epistemic state is compatible with φ.
The Orthodox Semantics contrasts with what I will call the Heterodox Semantics
for modal claims. On the latter, modal claims do not express ordinary propositions at all—
that is, they do not describe what the world is like. Instead, modal claims express first-order
properties an information state might have (“information state” is just a general term for a
state of belief, knowledge, or supposition; I’ll explain what a “first-order” property is in a
10See Hawthorne (2012), Littlejohn (2011), and Dougherty and Rysiew (2009) for versions of the orthodoxy
based on knowledge, certain knowledge, and evidence, respectively. See Stanley (2005), Dowell (2011),
and DeRose (1991) for versions of the orthodoxy based on the speaker’s knowledge, group knowledge, and
accessible knowledge, respectively.
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moment). Here is one version of this theory: it might be that φ expresses the property of an
information state’s being compatible with φ. If everything I believe is compatible with φ,
then my belief state has this property—namely, being compatible with φ—and the modal
claim is true of my belief state.
This type of semantics is typically used to develop relativist or expressivist theories of
epistemic modal discourse.11 For example, on a relativist theory like John MacFarlane’s
(2011; 2014), modal claims vary in their truth depending on the context from which they are
assessed. If I say “it might rain”, what I said will be true as assessed by me if what I know
is compatible with rain, while the very same modal claim will be false as assessed by you if
what you know rules out the possibility of rain. The modal claim is effectively information-
neutral: instead of describing how things stand with some particular information state—the
speaker’s, a group’s, etc.—the modal claim leaves open which information state matters and
so is true relative to some information states and false relative to others. Finally, the truth
of the modal claim at an information state just turns on how that information state itself
bears on φ—say, by being compatible with φ, or by ruling out φ. This is the sense in which
the property determined by the modal is “first-order”.
Let’s turn now to the question of how one might extend the Orthodox Semantics or
the Heterodox Semantics to reason claims.
3.3.2 Problems for Extending the Heterodox Semantics
Defenders of the Heterodox Semantics will often motivate this theory by its ability to
capture the type of eavesdropping data we discussed in §3.2.1. Suppose I don’t know where
the keys are and I say “The keys might be under the doormat”. On MacFarlane’s relativism,
I am warranted in making this assertion because the modal claim is true relative to the
context of assessment I presently occupy: what I know is compatible with the keys being
under the doormat. However, if you’ve already checked the doormat, you are entitled to
11See, for instance, MacFarlane (2011, 2014), Moss (2013, 2015), Rothschild (2012), Swanson (2006, 2011,
2016), Willer (2013), and Yalcin (2007, 2011, 2012a); Egan’s (2007) relativism employs what is essentially a
notational variant of the Heterodox Semantics. But let me be clear: the Heterodox Semantics is not
the only semantic framework for developing relativism. One of the morals of this paper is that we need to
take seriously the possibility of a non-standard version of relativism. This will become clearer after §3.4.3;
see Appendix A for the details.
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reject my assertion because what I said is false at the context of assessment you presently
occupy: what you know is incompatible with the keys being under the doormat.
A structurally parallel semantics allows us to explain the eavesdropping data about
reason claims in exactly the same way. Suppose there is (every/good/little) reason to believe
that φ determines a first-order property of an information state: that of counting in favor
of believing that φ.12 A reason claim will then be true of an information state s just in
case s counts in favor of believing that φ.13 There is no consensus yet on how exactly to
understand this sort of counting-in-favor-of relation, but the following is a simple stand-in
that will suffice for our purposes: s counts in favor of believing that φ just in case s makes
it reasonably likely that φ.
Let’s apply this semantics to the case discussed in §3.2.1. Recall that the DA learns
that large quantities of drugs were found in Pete’s car and on this basis claims there is good
reason to believe that Pete is a drug trafficker. But Detective Barnes discovers that the
drugs were planted and so rejects the DA’s assertion. A relativist deployment of our above
semantics explains why each party is warranted in saying what she did. The DA is warranted
in making her assertion because the reason claim is true relative to her state of information:
what she knows makes it reasonably likely that Pete is a trafficker. But Barnes is warranted
in rejecting the DA’s assertion because the reason claim is false relative to Barnes’ state of
information: what Barnes knows does not make it reasonably likely that Pete is a trafficker.
The Heterodox Semantics for modal claims would thus appear to offer an attractive model
for the semantics of reason claims.
However, there is a problem: any plausible, heterodox-style semantics for reason claims
will inevitably make the wrong predictions about how these expressions embed.
12The differences between the grades of every reason, good reason, and little reason will plausibly reflect the
degree to which the information state counts in favor of believing that φ. I will set aside these complications
in what follows. Furthermore, it is plausible there exist uses of reason claims on which they characterize only
a proper subset of a given information state as counting in favor of believing that φ. This reading is easier
to access in sentences like the following: “I grant that there is some reason to believe that P, but in fact, I
think that not-P.” I will set aside this reading in what follows. But even if one maintains—implausibly—that
reason claims only or typically characterize proper subsets of an information state, the problem I raise below
for extending the Heterodox Semantics remains.
13Kolodny (ms.) endorses a similar semantics. Finlay (2014, Chapter 4) and Henning (2014) hold a similar
view about relational reason claims. They take sentences of the form φ is a reason to believe that ψ to be
true relative to some background information state s.
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To understand this problem, it will be helpful to first see how the
Heterodox Semantics explains the infelicity of embedded epistemic contradictions. Recall
that epistemic contradictions have the following general form: φ and might not-φ. Recall
also that on the Heterodox Semantics, might not-φ does not express a proposition about
people’s epistemic states. The sentence just determines a first-order property of an informa-
tion state: that of being compatible with not-φ. This account of the semantic function of
might not-φ pairs naturally with a view about the state of mind of believing, supposing, or,
in general terms, accepting might not-φ: to accept this sentence is not to have an attitude
towards a proposition about people’s epistemic states—accepting the sentence just involves
being in an information state that has the property expressed by the sentence. That is, to
suppose that might not-φ is just to be in a suppositional state that leaves open the possibility
of not-φ.14 Now consider an embedded epistemic contradiction: suppose that φ and might
not-φ. To suppose that φ is to be in a suppositional state that rules out the possibility of
not-φ. To suppose that might not-φ is to be in a suppositional state that leaves open the pos-
sibility of not-φ. No coherent suppositional state has both of these properties—that of both
ruling out and leaving open not-φ—which explains why embedded epistemic contradictions
sound odd.15
Now consider the state of mind of supposing a reason contradiction. On our heterodox-
style semantics from above, a reason claim determines the following property of an informa-
tion state: that of counting in favor of believing that φ. Accordingly, to suppose there is
reason to believe that φ is not to suppose some proposition about people’s epistemic states—
the supposition just involves being in a suppositional state whose content counts in favor of
believing that φ.16 But notice: if you suppose that φ, you are supposing something that
14Yalcin (2011) also requires that the attitude holder be sensitive to the question of whether not-φ. This
qualification will not affect the discussion that follows.
15See Yalcin (2007) for the further details of this explanation.
16Greco (2014, 211) endorses a similar view about the mental state of believing one ought to believe that
φ: “[T]he judgment that one ought to believe that φ is understood as a species of belief that φ”. In other
words, the belief that one ought to believe that φ does not take as its object some proposition about people’s
knowledge; the belief is just a special way of being related to φ itself.
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counts conclusively in favor of believing that φ—namely, φ itself.17 Thus, to suppose that φ
is to suppose that there is reason to believe that φ. Hence, it is incoherent to suppose both
that φ and that there is no reason to believe that φ. But of course, this is absurd. As we
saw in §3.2.2, there is nothing incoherent about entertaing a scenario in which (say) one’s
gas gauge is broken but there is no reason to believe that the gauge is broken.
The problem generalizes to aﬄict any heterodox-style semantics for reason claims that
satisfies the following two constraints:18
(a) If there is reason to believe that φ is true of an information state s, then there is no
reason to believe that φ is false of s.
(b) If s entails that φ, then there is reason to believe that φ is true of s.
(a) follows from a basic point about the logic of epistemic reasons: there being reason to
believe that φ is inconsistent with there being no reason to believe that φ. (b) is extremely
plausible: surely an information state’s entailing that φ supplies at least reason to believe
that φ. However, (a) and (b) together ensure that it is incoherent to entertain a reason
contradiction. To suppose that φ is to get into an information state s that rules out the
possibility of not-φ and so entails that φ. Thus, by (b), there is reason to believe that φ will
be true of s. Hence, by (a), there is no reason to believe that φ will be false of s. Whence,
there is no coherent suppositional state s that both accepts that φ and that there is no reason
to believe that φ. But this result is absurd. So reason claims do not have a heterodox-style
semantics.
It is a surprising fact that we cannot extend the Heterodox Semantics to reason claims.
MacFarlane and others had explicitly designed the Heterodox Semantics to account for
the eavesdropping data about modal claims. But as we’ve just seen, this semantics is actually
inapplicable to the case of reason claims, even though reason claims generate the very same
type of eavesdropping data.
17One might object that φ is not a reason for believing that φ. But this claim runs counter to a variety of
theories about the counting-in-favor-of relation and related views about evidential support. The conditional
probability of φ given φ is 1, so as long as the prior probability of φ is less than 1, Bayesians will take φ
to confirm φ. Similarly, φ entails that φ, so hypothetico-deductivists will take φ to confirm φ. And many
epistemologists hold that in cases of veridical perception or veridical introspection, one’s reason for believing
that φ is simply φ itself (see, for instance, McDowell (1994) and Neta (2011)).
18See Appendix B for a formal proof of this point.
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3.3.3 Problems for Extending the Orthodox Semantics
Here is where we are in the dialectic: we are looking for a structural parallel in the seman-
tics of reason and modal claims capable of supporting a unified explanation of the shared
eavesdropping data. And we’ve just seen that this structural parallel cannot be found by
extending the Heterodox Semantics to reason claims.
Suppose we try instead to extend the Orthodox Semantics to reason claims. On
this view, reason and modal claims would have a structurally parallel semantics in the
following sense: both claims would express propositions concerning how things stand with
some contextually relevant epistemic state. It might be that φ would describe the relevant
state as being compatible with φ, while there is reason to believe that φ would describe the
relevant state as counting in favor of believing that φ.
Now, if reason claims have this type of semantics, it is no mystery why reason con-
tradictions are coherent to entertain: to suppose a reason contradiction would just be to
entertain a scenario in which φ is true but someone’s epistemic state does not count in favor
of believing that φ.
However, epistemic contradictions describe extremely similar scenarios, if the Orthodox
Semantics is correct: on this semantics, an epistemic contradiction just describes a scenario
in which φ is true but someone fails to know that φ. Thus, if reason and modal claims both
have an orthodox-style semantics, why are epistemic contradictions far more difficult to
entertain than reason contradictions?
The problem runs deeper. Defenders of the Orthodox Semantics have devoted a great
deal of attention to the task of explaining why embedded epistemic contradictions sound
odd.19 If “the gauge might not be broken” just means that someone fails to know it is
broken, then it’s not clear why there is an obvious difference in felicity between sentences
like the following:
(13) # Imagine a scenario in which the gauge is broken, but it might not be broken.
(14) Imagine a scenario in which the gauge is broken, but Jake doesn’t know it’s broken.
19See Crabill (2013), Dorr and Hawthorne (2013), Ninan (forthcoming), Silk (2017), Sorensen (2009),
Stojnic´ (2016, forthcoming), and Yanovich (2014).
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The existing responses to this problem typically draw on some aspect of the pragmatics of
epistemic modals. It is claimed that the contextual flexibility of these expressions accounts
for their contrast with overt descriptions of knowledge, as in (14). However, if reason claims
also describe contextually relevant epistemic states, then all of these pragmatic theories
would seem to be false—for reason contradictions embed just fine.
Let me give one specific example of this problem. Some theorists claim that embedded
epistemic contradictions sound bad because it’s not clear whose epistemic state is at issue,
as compared with sentences like (14).20 But embedded reason contradictions also do not
specify whose epistemic state is at issue, and yet they sound fine:21
(15) Imagine a scenario in which the gauge is broken, but there’s no reason to believe it’s
broken.
The general problem is this: if we extend the Orthodox Semantics to reason claims,
it’s hard to see how any pragmatics could engage with modal claims but not reason claims so
as to predict their difference in embedding behavior. After all, on this proposal, reason and
modal claims would both be context-sensitive expressions that describe how things stand
with some relevant epistemic state. Thus, while our extension of the Orthodox Semantics
explains the embeddability of reason contradictions, the view yields an incoherent picture of
the language of subjective uncertainty as a whole.
This is a surprising result. The Orthodox Semantics remains a popular theory, and as
we noted above, many authors identify reasons for belief with items of knowledge. In fact,
John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley each defend both of these theories.22 But it turns out
that we cannot integrate these views to provide a unified account of the semantics of reasons
and modals.
20See Crabill (2013) and Dorr and Hawthorne (2013).
21Dorr and Hawthorne have a move available to them here. Their explanation of the epistemic contradiction
data also relies on modal claims’ having what they call “constrained interpretations”. Dorr and Hawthorne
might therefore deny that reason claims have such interpretations, which could in turn account for the
contrast in embedding data. However, this only deepens the puzzle, for Dorr and Hawthorne also rely on
these constrained interpretations to explain eavesdropping data (see Dorr and Hawthorne (2013, 880) and
Hawthorne (2007)).
22See Hawthorne (2012), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), and Stanley (2005).
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We arrive now at our puzzle: What should the semantics of reason claims be? These
expressions give rise to the distinctive pattern of eavesdropping data that has led numerous
theorists to propose novel accounts of the semantics of epistemic modals. All of this suggests
that reason claims have some kind of structurally parallel semantics. However, the difference
in the embedding data makes it hard to see what this parallel could possibly be: neither the
Orthodox Semantics nor the Heterodox Semantics can supply a unified semantics for
reason and modal claims.
3.4 A SOLUTION
Any solution to our puzzle will involve constraining the semantics of reasons and modals
along two different dimensions. First, we must identify some kind of structural parallel
capable of supporting a unified explanation of the shared eavesdropping data. Second, this
structural parallel must be such as to allow for the differences in embedding data.
Here are the views I will defend:
Mentalistic Semantics for Epistemic Reasons: Reason claims describe how things
stand with the relevant knowledge, or more broadly, the information that lies within a
thinker’s “epistemic reach” (Egan (2007)).
Veritic Semantics for Epistemic Modals: Modal claims describe how things stand
with the relevant truths, where there is no requirement that these truths be known or
otherwise related to anyone’s epistemic state.
If these views are correct, then reason and modal claims have the following structural parallel:
both describe how things stand with relevant bodies of information. I will argue that this
structural parallel is what accounts for the similarity in eavesdropping data. Nevertheless,
each expression describes different types of information—knowledge vs. mere truths—and
this difference is what accounts for the difference in embedding data.23
23Strictly speaking, Mentalistic Semantics is consistent with a variety of views about exactly what
type of epistemic state reason claims describe—e.g. evidence, knowledge, certain knowledge, or accessible
knowledge. But for the sake convenience I will often gloss this theory as holding that reason claims describe
knowledge.
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3.4.1 Characterizing Each Semantics
Mentalistic Semantics should seem like a familiar theory. All we have done here is trans-
pose the central idea behind the Orthodox Semantics for modal claims to the case of
reason claims: the latter describe relevant epistemic states.24
There is a straightforward motivation for this semantics that was already implicit in our
discussion of reason contradictions above. Notice that there are striking parallels between
reason contradictions like (16) and Moore-paradoxical sentences like (17):
(16) # The gauge is broken, but there’s no reason to believe it’s broken.
(17) # The gauge is broken, but I don’t know it’s broken.
Both sentences sound bad when asserted, but they describe possibilities it is coherent to
entertain:
(18) Suppose the gauge is broken, but there’s no reason to believe it’s broken.
(19) Suppose the gauge is broken, but I don’t know it’s broken.
A simple explanation of these parallels is that reason claims leave implicit what Moore-
paradoxical sentences make explicit: both describe how things stand with some relevant body
of knowledge. Each is coherent to entertain because each describes failures of knowledge.
Each is a bad thing to assert because asserting that φ represents oneself as knowing that φ,
and one’s knowing that φ contradicts one’s not knowing that φ or there being no reason to
believe that φ.
Now, we’ve already seen the tension in holding that reason and modal claims both
describe knowledge: if both have this function, then it’s extremely difficult to see how
one could explain their difference in embedding behavior. However, there is an option we
haven’t yet considered: suppose one adopts an orthodox-style semantics for reason claims
and the Heterodox Semantics for modal claims—i.e. reason claims are context-sensitive
descriptions of knowledge, while modal claims determine first-order properties of information
states. Call this the Split View.
24One caveat: I want to leave open the possibility that reason claims characterize epistemic states without
literally describing them by expressing propositions about particular epistemic states. The possibility of this
type of theory will only become clear in Appendix A, so I will set it aside for now.
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The Split View is a step in the right direction. As we discussed in §3.3.2, the Hetero-
dox Semantics accounts for the infelicity of embedded epistemic contradictions, and as we
just discussed above, a knowledge-describing semantics for reason claims accounts for the
felicity of embedded reason contradictions. Thus, the Split View captures the difference in
embedding data.
However, by sacrificing a structural parallel in the semantics of reason and modal claims,
the Split View fails to provide a unified explanation of the eavesdropping data. If the Split
View were correct, we would need to come up with two explanations of the eavesdropping
data: one along contextualist lines to account for the data about reason claims, and one
along relativist or expressivist lines to account for the data about modal claims. But the
existing models for each type of explanation work in fundamentally different ways.25 It would
be very unusual if the same pattern of data had such different explanations. Perhaps we
could live with this result if this were the best we could do. But it isn’t.
Suppose instead that modal claims have a veritic semantics: they describe how things
stand with a set of relevant truths, where there is no requirement that these truths be known
or otherwise related to anyone’s epistemic state.26
Let me introduce this semantics by way of a comparison with the
Orthodox Semantics. Take a simple example:
(20) It might rain tonight.
According to the Orthodox Semantics, a use of (20) expresses a proposition whose truth
at a world w turns on how things stand with the contextually relevant individual or group’s
epistemic state at w.27 Such a proposition divides up the space of possible worlds according
to how things stand with people’s knowledge at those worlds: a world where the relevant
body of knowledge is compatible with rain is a world ruled in by the proposition, whereas
a world where the relevant body of knowledge is inconsistent with rain is a world ruled out
by the proposition. This is what it means for the modal claim to “describe” a body of
knowledge.
25See, for instance, the dispute between von Fintel and Gillies (2008, 2011) and MacFarlane (2011, 2014).
26See Marushak and Shaw (ms.) for development and defense of this view.
27For the sake of simplicity, I will henceforth take the relevant epistemic state to be a state of knowledge.
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Veritic Semantics treats (20) differently. On a simple, contextualist version of this
semantics, a use of (20) expresses a proposition whose truth at a world w turns on how things
stand with the contextually relevant true propositions at w. Examples of such propositions
might be: the true propositions describing the shape of the clouds overhead and the rates of
approaching storm fronts (say).28 The proposition expressed by (20) will then be true at a
world w just in case the shape of the clouds and rates of approaching storm fronts at w are
consistent with rain. Such a proposition divides up the space of possible worlds according to
how things stand with the meteorological facts at those worlds: a world where the relevant
facts are compatible with rain is a world ruled in by the proposition, whereas a world where
the relevant facts are inconsistent with rain is a world ruled out by the proposition.
Veritic Semantics and the Orthodox Semantics thus give two very different accounts
of the proposition expressed by (20). On the first, the truth of this proposition at a world
simply turns on how things stand with the meteorological facts at this world. On the second,
the truth of the proposition at a world turns on how things stand with what people know
at this world. Plausibly, there are possible worlds where the relevant knowers fail to know
all of the relevant truths, so these two accounts of the proposition expressed by (20) are not
equivalent.
Still, let me caution against one potential misunderstanding of Veritic Semantics.
It might seem that defenders of this view must deny that knowledge plays a role in the
interpretation of epistemic modals. But this is a mistake. It is entirely consistent with
Veritic Semantics that a modal claim describes a particular set of truths precisely because
these propositions are the ones known by the speaker to be true at the world of the context of
use. For example, suppose someone is staring at the clouds and says “it might rain tonight”.
Veritic Semantics gives a natural characterization of the proposition expressed by this
utterance: the speaker is proposing that the shape of the clouds is consistent with rain. This
proposition will be true at a world depending on how things stand with the shape of the
28Let me temporarily set aside the question of how the context of use determines which propositions are
relevant. This is a challenging question about the pragmatics of language that arises also for defenders of the
Orthodox Semantics—after all, they must explain how the context of use settles which body of knowledge
is relevant. But just to fix ideas, one might hold that the relevant truths are determined in part by the
speaker’s intentions, the aims of the conversation, and the propositions salient in the context as being true.
I’ll have more to say about contextual relevance below in §§3.4.2–3.4.3.
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clouds at that world. But notice: it is highly plausible that the speaker’s utterance expresses
this proposition because she is aware of and attending to the shape of the clouds. The key
point here is that the speaker’s knowledge can influence which proposition is expressed by
a modal claim without the modal claim literally describing the speaker’s knowledge. There
will be many worlds at which the speaker is entirely ignorant of the shape of the clouds, but
the truth of the modal claim at these worlds still just turns on how things stand with the
shape of the clouds themselves. This is what it means to say that the proposition describes
the meteorological facts, not the speaker’s knowledge.
Now, some might object that we cannot make sense of how a speaker is warranted in
asserting a modal claim unless this claim describes the speaker’s knowledge. But consider
an ordinary factual claim like “it’s raining”. The proposition expressed by this sentence
does not describe the speaker’s knowledge. Rather, the proposition is true at a world just in
case it is raining at this world, and there will be many such worlds at which the speaker is
entirely ignorant of whether it’s raining. But of course, it does not follow that no one is ever
warranted in asserting that it’s raining. All it takes for one to be warranting in asserting
“it’s raining” is that one know that it is raining at the world in which one uses this sentence.
Similarly, all it takes for one to be warranted in asserting “it might be raining” is that one
know that the relevant meteorological facts at the world in which one uses this sentence are
compatible with rain. Thus, the possibility of warranted assertion does not require modal
claims to literally describe the speaker’s knowledge.
However, it is even consistent with Veritic Semantics that a modal claim does occa-
sionally describe the speaker’s knowledge. The interests of the speaker or the larger aim of
the conversation may well support a reading of a modal claim on which the relevant truths
are those concerning what the speaker knows. The central claim of Veritic Semantics is
just that there is no default preference for describing mentalistic truths of this sort. Truths
about what people know are a small subset of the many truths one might be interested in
characterizing by means of a modal claim. So we should expect such mentalistic truths to
show up only occasionally as the relevant truths that modal claims describe.
To sum up: On the view I defend, it is reason claims, not modal claims, that characteris-
tically function to describe bodies of knowledge. The difference between each semantics lies
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in the proposition expressed by a typical use of each sentence: the truth of a reason claim
turns on how things stand with what is known at a world, while the truth of a modal claim
turns on how things stand with the facts at a world—facts which may or may not be known
by any contextually relevant individuals.
Let’s now consider how this proposal resolves the puzzle of the previous section.
3.4.2 Revisiting the Embedding Data
According to Veritic Semantics, modal claims describe how things stand with the relevant
truths. But relevance is often a matter of salience. Suppose I am dining with Mary and
her friends, and we are asked if anyone wants coffee. I reply, “No one wants coffee.” It is
clear I have thereby conveyed that Mary does not want coffee. On the standard account of
this phenomenon, the phrase “no one” quantifies over a set of relevant persons, and Mary’s
salience in the context makes her one of these persons.29 Thus, if none of these persons
wants coffee, then neither does Mary.
This theory also explains why the following sentence sounds contradictory:
(21) # Mary wants coffee, but no one wants coffee.
The first conjunct makes Mary a salient person, so she figures in the domain of the subsequent
quantifier “no one”—i.e. the first conjunct “restricts” the domain of the quantifier in the
second. Thus, any world at which the first conjunct is true will be a world at which the
second is false.
Veritic Semantics makes an analogous prediction about epistemic contradictions like
(22):
(22) # The gauge is broken, but it might not be broken.
Modals are standardly understood as quantifiers whose domains are restricted by sets of
propositions.30 The distinctive claim of Veritic Semantics is that modal domains are
restricted by relevant truths—these truths need not be known or otherwise related to anyone’s
epistemic state. Now return to (22): to assert that the gauge is broken is to make this
29See, for instance, von Fintel (1994) and Stanley and Szabo´ (2000).
30See Kratzer (1977, 1981, 2012).
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proposition salient as being true. But again, relevance is often a matter of salience. So
we should expect the proposition that the gauge is broken to restrict the domain of the
subsequent modal—after all, the modal is characterizing relevant truths and the proposition
in question is salient as being true. Hence, asserting (22) describes the world as being such
that the gauge is broken and that it is compatible with the relevant truths—including the
fact that the gauge is broken—that the gauge is not broken. But no world has this property,
which is why the sentence sounds odd.
Notice that such domain restriction effects persist in suppositional environments:
(23) # Suppose Mary wants coffee, but no one wants coffee.
Here again Mary figures in the domain of “no one”. So it is no surprise that embedded
epistemic contradictions continue to sound contradictory:
(24) # Suppose the gauge is broken, but it might not be broken.
(24) asks us to entertain a scenario in which it is true that the gauge is broken and in which
it is compatible with the relevant truths—including the fact that the gauge is broken—that
the gauge is not broken. But there are no such scenarios, so the sentence sounds odd.31
Contrast the situation with reason contradictions:
(25) Suppose the gauge is broken, but there’s no reason to believe it’s broken.
If reason claims describe relevant knowledge, then supposing that the gauge is broken should
not suffice to make this information part of the information that matters for assessing the
truth of a subsequent reason claim. For to merely suppose that the gauge is broken is not
to suppose that anyone knows or has evidence for thinking that the gauge is broken. It is
therefore easy to access a felicitous reading of (25) on which the sentence just asks us to
entertain a scenario in which the gauge is broken but in which the epistemic state of some
individual or group fails to count in favor of believing that the gauge is broken. Thus, it is
the difference in the type of information described by reason and modal claims that explains
the difference in embedding behavior.
31See Marushak and Shaw (ms.) for discussion of additional parallels between epistemic contradictions
and what we call quantified contradictions, i.e. sentences like “Mary wants coffee, but no one wants coffee”.
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The key to this explanation lies in the fact that we’ve identified different default con-
straints on the interpretation of reason and modal claims. There is no general mechanism
by which the information that the gauge is broken restricts the domain of any information-
describing expression that comes later in the sentence. Were there such a mechanism, em-
bedded reason contradictions would sound bad as well.32 Instead, the information that the
gauge is broken restricts the domain of subsequent epistemic modals only because these
modals by default characterize mere truths. In contrast, reason claims by default character-
ize relevant epistemic states, so the mere salience of the gauge’s being broken does not suffice
for this information to count as relevant for the truth of the reason claim: the reason claim is
characterizing relevant epistemic states, but the gauge can be broken without anyone being
in a position to know this fact. So again, it is the difference in the type of information each
expression describes that accounts for the difference in embedding behavior.
3.4.3 Revisiting the Eavesdropping Data
While reason and modal claims differ in which type of information they characterize, there is
nevertheless an underlying unity in their basic semantic function: both describe how things
stand with relevant bodies of information. I propose that this unity in basic function is what
accounts for the common pattern in eavesdropping data.
Notice that many of the existing explanations of the eavesdropping data about modals
make no essential reference to which type of information these expressions describe. For
example, on the “cloudy contextualism” of von Fintel and Gillies (2011), a use of a modal
claim “puts into play” a set of propositions describing how things stand with different bodies
of knowledge.33 One proposition describes how things stand with the speaker’s knowledge,
while another describes how things stand with a larger group’s knowledge. The speaker is
warranted in asserting a modal claim as long as she is warranted in asserting at least one
of these propositions. But a listener is warranted in rejecting a modal claim as long as she
32The behavior of reason contradictions thus falsifies the accounts of epistemic contradictions given in Silk
(2017) and Stojnic´ (2016, forthcoming), as these accounts rely precisely on such general purpose domain
restriction mechanisms.
33More precisely, it is uses of “bare” modals—i.e. modals whose domains are not already restricted by
some further element of the discourse—that put into play sets of propositions.
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is warranted in denying the most informative proposition about which she has an opinion.
This theory explains why a listener with more information can reject an assertion that the
speaker was nevertheless warranted in making. For suppose that the speaker is warranted
in asserting one of the weaker propositions in the set, such as the one that concerns her own
body of knowledge. And suppose the listener is warranted in denying one of the stronger
propositions in the set, such as the one that concerns how things stand with the group’s body
of knowledge. On the cloudy contextualist model, both parties are within their linguistic
rights when the speaker makes an assertion that the listener rejects.
This explanation goes through just as well if modal claims describe relevant truths. A
use of a modal claim will put into play a set of propositions whose members describe how
things stand with different batches of truths. A speaker might be warranted in asserting one
of the weaker propositions in this set, while a listener might be warranted in denying one of
the stronger propositions in this set. And of course, a parallel story can be told for reason
claims, as they have essentially the same semantics von Fintel and Gillies (2011) attribute
to modal claims.
We thus arrive at a unified explanation of the eavesdropping data. If reason and modal
claims both describe relevant bodies of information, it is open for us to hold that neither
describes a unique body of information in a typical context of use. Both expressions might
put into play sets of propositions, which in turn give rise to the characteristic pattern of
eavesdropping data.
Let me emphasize that cloudy contextualism is just one option for explaining the eaves-
dropping data. There are others.34 The important point here is that the semantics I’ve given
allows for a unified explanation of the data and provides a clue as to the general shape it
should take—namely, the explanation should rely on some common feature of information-
describing expressions, one that is shared among expressions that nevertheless differ in which
type of information they describe.
34See Appendix A for a non-standard relativist explanation of the data.
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3.5 CONCLUSION: THE CONCEPT OF AN EPISTEMIC REASON
We began with a puzzle about the semantics of epistemic reasons. The shared eavesdropping
data suggests that reason and modal claims have some type of structurally parallel semantics.
But the difference in embedding data rules out extending each of the leading semantics for
modal claims to reason claims. How, then, can we give a semantics for reason claims that
accounts for both their similarities and differences with modal claims?
I argued that the solution to this puzzle lies in embracing a novel semantics for epistemic
modals: it is reason claims that describe knowledge, while modal claims describe truths.
This theory immediately explains the difference in embedding data. The theory also allows
us to give a unified explanation of the similarity in eavesdropping data. And all of this
takes place within a single semantic framework on which reason and modals claims both
describe relevant bodies of information. None of the other accounts of epistemic modals can
be integrated with the semantics of reasons to yield a theory with all of these virtues. So
it turns out that the language of epistemic reasons has much to teach us about epistemic
modals.
But do we learn anything about epistemic reasons as well? I will conclude with some brief
reflections on this question. I will argue that the semantics of epistemic reasons ultimately
helps us understand our concept of an epistemic reason.
Let me first make a point about epistemic modals. In hindsight, it should come as no
surprise that modal claims describe relevant truths. When we engage in deliberation about
whether it might be that φ, we typically do so because we are interested in the question
of whether φ. The bearing of a set of true propositions is extremely relevant to this latter
question, for if these propositions are inconsistent with φ, then φ must be false.
Furthermore, it should come as no surprise that modal claims merely describe relevant
truths. There is no mentalistic restriction on quantifier domains generally. If I say “All of
the students have left the classroom”, it is easy to hear this sentence as false if a student
is hiding in the closet.35 What I said does not mean that all of the students I’m aware
of left the classroom. Now compare: modals are just quantifiers of a special sort—namely,
35cf. Ichikawa (2011, 384).
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quantifiers whose domains are restricted by sets of propositions. So it would be surprising
if there were some mentalistic restriction on modal domains, whereby these domains are
restricted only by the truths of which some thinker is aware. And indeed, might φ does not
mean that all of the truths I’m aware of are compatible with φ. To be sure, one will only be
warranted in asserting a claim about how things stand with the truths of which one is aware.
But the mistake behind the Orthodox Semantics was to bake this fact about pragmatics
into the semantics of epistemic modals. Once we consider embedded uses of modal claims,
we see that these expressions characterize relevant truths regardless of whether these truths
are connected to anyone’s epistemic state. This is why one cannot easily entertain a scenario
in which φ is true and it is possible that not-φ.
But then one wonders: Why don’t reason claims merely describe relevant truths as well?
Why is there a default preference built into the semantics of reason claims for describing
bodies of knowledge, or information connected to thinkers’ epistemic states?
My answer is that the semantics of epistemic reasons reflects of our concept of an epis-
temic reason. Philosophers will often distinguish between so-called objective reasons vs. the
reasons one “has” or “possesses”.36 The first are simply true propositions, while the second
are propositions to which a thinker enjoys some kind of epistemic or cognitive access—
e.g. they are the propositions that one knows or perhaps merely believes. However, what
I’ve essentially argued above is that there is a semantic default for speaking of possessed rea-
sons when it comes to talk of reasons for belief in natural language: reason claims describe
how things stand with the information connected to thinkers’ epistemic states.37
I will now argue that this semantic default is conceptual in origin: our pre-theoretical
concept of an epistemic reason is that of a piece of information that is known, easily known,
believed, or otherwise related to a thinker’s epistemic state. In short: our pre-theoretical
concept of an epistemic reason is that of a possessed epistemic reason. Call this the Con-
ceptual Priority Thesis.
36See, for instance, Comesan˜a and McGrath (2014), Henning (2014), Hornsby (2008), Lord (2010, 2015),
Neta (2008a, 2011), Schroeder (2008, 2011), and Skorupski (2010, 108).
37Let me emphasize that I am using the term “epistemic state” broadly, so that it includes not only states
of knowledge but also states of evidence, or even experiences. I use the term in this manner so as not to
beg any questions about whether possessed epistemic reasons must be factive. See Comesan˜a and McGrath
(2014), Lord (2010), and Schroeder (2008) for discussion.
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The Conceptual Priority Thesis is a claim about the concepts we bring to philo-
sophical inquiry. It is a claim about what we ordinarily take epistemic reasons to be. Of
course, our pre-theoretical concept does not settle the final shape of a philosophical analysis
of this concept. But neither can our pre-theoretical concept be ignored. Faithfulness to
our pre-theoretical concept is one of the main criteria for evaluating a philosophical anal-
ysis of a concept (e.g. consider the role of Gettier cases in undermining the JTB analysis
of knowledge). Our pre-theoretical concept also governs the metaphysical analysis of the
property picked out by this concept (e.g. it would be a serious mark against an account of
the nature of water if water turns out not to be the stuff that fills the oceans). So while
the Conceptual Priority Thesis does not settle the metaphysics or conceptual analysis
of reasons, this thesis will place important constraints on how we approach these issues.
Let me turn, then, to my argument for the Conceptual Priority Thesis. The argument
is simple: this thesis offers the best explanation of the semantic default for speaking of
possessed epistemic reasons. Consider some of the alternatives.
One explanation might appeal to the constraints on what it takes for someone to be
warranted in asserting a reason claim. One is not warranted in making a claim about how
things stand with reasons one doesn’t possess. So perhaps there is a semantic default for
describing the reasons one does possess. But this constraint is far too strong: we’ve already
seen from the eavesdropping data in §3.2.1 that reason claims do not simply describe the
speaker’s knowledge—if they did, it’s not clear how an eavesdropper with more information
could ever be warranted in rejecting a speaker’s assertion of a reason claim. The semantic
default we seek to explain is not that reason claims describe the speaker’s reasons but that
reason claims describe someone’s reasons—i.e. reason claims by default describe how things
stand with information connected to thinkers’ epistemic states.
One might argue instead that this semantic default is merely an accident of the English
language. It is a complex empirical question whether this is correct. But let me offer some
reasons for doubt. Talk of reasons for belief is not unique to English. And indeed, native
speakers of Cantonese, Dutch, German, Italian, and Spanish have confirmed that these
languages contain roughly synonymous expressions. So at present, an appeal to linguistic
accident is mere speculation.
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Another explanation might appeal to a claim about concept acquisition: perhaps the
semantic default is no accident because we acquire the concept of an objective reason only
after we acquire the concept of a possessed reason. But the problem here is that the order of
concept acquisition frequently fails generate semantic defaults for interpretations involving
the initially acquired concept. For example, there is a consensus in developmental psychology
that children acquire the concept of epistemic modality after grasping the concept of deontic
modality (i.e. modality concerning obligations and permissions).38 But modals like “might”
have a default epistemic interpretation, while other modals have no default interpretation
one way or the other.
Compare now the explanation offered by the Conceptual Priority Thesis: talk of
epistemic reasons is talk of knowledge, evidence, or information within a thinker’s epistemic
reach because this is what we ordinarily take epistemic reasons to be. This theory is simple,
intuitive, and explains why it is no accident that a language would include such a default.
However, the Conceptual Priority Thesis is not entirely innocent. Indeed, the thesis
calls into question widely held views about the nature of reasons. For example, according to
T.M. Scanlon, reasons in general are just facts that count in favor of things, so reasons for
belief are just facts that count in favor of belief.39 Consider also what Mark Schroeder calls
the Factoring Account. On this account, possessed reasons are objective reasons that we
possess—i.e. the concept of a possessed reason is factored into the concepts of an objective
reason and the possession relation.40
The Conceptual Priority Thesis suggests that both of these accounts are getting
things backwards. On our pre-theoretical understanding of reasons for belief, it is not as
though the world contains reasons for belief that are out there, hidden, and awaiting our
discovery. Rather, facts are only intelligible as reasons for belief in relation to a thinker
who is aware of or could easily come to be aware of these facts. It is therefore a mistake to
analyze the reasons we possess as facts that are reasons which we in turn possess.
38See Papafragou (2002) for an overview of this literature.
39See Scanlon (1998, 17) and Scanlon (2014, 30), as well as Alvarez (2010, Chapter 2), Finlay (2014, 85),
Parfit (2011, 31–32), and Reisner and Steglich-Petersen (2011, 1).
40See Schroeder (2008, 2011). Note that Schroeder himself rejects the Factoring Account. Lord (2010)
defends the account against Schroeder’s objections. See Schroeder (2008) for discussion of the role the
account may have implicitly played in the development of 20th-century epistemology.
54
The concept of an objective epistemic reason is plausibly understood as a philosophical
abstraction based on the more fundamental notion of a possessed epistemic reason. We start
by noticing that some of our beliefs are based on reasons that count in favor of holding
these beliefs. We then isolate the counting-in-favor-of-belief relation and ask what it takes
for this relation to obtain: some take the relation to be probabilistic, others take it to be
explanatory, and so on. We finally introduce the concept of an objective epistemic reason to
mark off the true propositions that stand in the counting-in-favor-of-belief relation.
However, the Conceptual Priority Thesis should caution us from simply classifying
these propositions as reasons for belief themselves. On our pre-theoretical concept of an
epistemic reason, facts only count as reasons for belief if they lie within the epistemic reach
of a thinker.
The upshot is this: philosophers have widely misunderstood the relation between epis-
temic reasons and epistemic modals. They have taken the former to merely concern facts
and the latter to concern knowledge. But in reality, it is the reverse that is true.
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4.0 HOW TO FORMULATE FALLIBILISM
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Fallibilism commands near-universal acceptance in recent epistemology.
But there is a surprising lack of consensus on how to formulate the view. For example,
Cohen (1988) and Lewis (1996) both develop contextualist epistemologies on which S knows
that φ is sometimes true even if S’s evidence fails to entail that φ. But Cohen thinks this
position vindicates fallibilism, while Lewis thinks fallibilism “mad”. Consider also the recent
debate over the semantics of so-called concessive knowledge attributions, or CKAs—i.e. sen-
tences of the form S knows that φ, but it’s possible/it might be that ψ, where ψ entails not-φ,
and the modal in the second conjunct receives the epistemic interpretation.1 Stanley (2005)
denies that CKAs state the fallibilist thesis, while Reed (2013, 53) takes certain CKAs to
be “obvious” consequences of the view. Leite (2010) concurs with Stanley, while Worsnip
(2015, 225 n. 1) describes Stanley as attempting to “reconstrue fallibilism less ambitiously”
so as to avoid the challenge posed by CKAs.
In this paper, I aim to clarify the formulation of fallibilism by defending the following
general claim: fallibilism is just a thesis about the type of epistemic position consistent with
knowledge, where a subject’s “epistemic position” consists of the grounds upon which she
might count as knowing that a proposition is true.2
1For now we can pick out the epistemic interpretation by ostension: it is the natural reading of might
and possible in sentences like The spare key might be under the doormat and It’s possible that the teachers
will strike. The term “concessive knowledge attribution” is due to Rysiew (2001).
2I intend the “grounds of knowledge” to be interpreted broadly, so as to include both internalist and
externalist types of justifications. However, the grounds of knowing that φ will exclude the knowledge that
φ itself.
56
Some may think this formulation obvious and hardly worthy of extended defense. But
the defense is urgently needed. Many epistemologists characterize fallibilism in other terms—
e.g. as the view that knowledge is consistent with the possibility of error, or that one can
know things that might be false, or that CKAs are sometimes true.3 Notably, each of these
formulations makes use of natural language epistemic possibility modals. It is widely held
that epistemic modals describe how things stand with some individual or group’s knowledge
or epistemic position.4 So the latter formulations might seem to be equivalent to the one I
intend to defend. However, I will argue that there is no such equivalence: epistemic modals
have no default function where they describe how things stand with anyone’s evidence,
knowledge, certain knowledge, or other epistemic state.
This point about epistemic modals has far-reaching consequences for how to theorize
about fallibilism. Once we see that “epistemic” modals do not describe epistemic states, it
becomes plain that epistemic modals have no place in the formulation of fallibilism. At best,
they render the view epistemologically insignificant; at worst, they leave the view unrecogniz-
able. A similar problem befalls several prominent arguments both for and against fallibilism.
These arguments rely on intuitions about epistemic modals, so the arguments either fail to
hit their mark, or they succeed by targeting only an epistemologically insignificant theory.
In short: if we want to know whether fallibilism is true, we need a new methodology.
4.2 WHAT IS FALLIBILISM?
“Fallibilism” is a theoretical term, but its definition cannot be settled by stipulation. Any
formulation of the view is answerable to a kind of rough and intuitive sense of the term,
on which knowledge is compatible with human fallibility, broadly construed. Here is how
DeRose (2017, 145) puts the point:
There seems to be an intuitive, but difficult-to-get-precise-about, sense in which we
3See, for instance, Dougherty (2011), Worsnip (2015), and Reed (2013), respectively.
4See, for instance, Anderson (2014), DeRose (1991, 1998), Dodd (2011), Dorr and Hawthorne (2013),
Dougherty and Rysiew (2009, 2011), Dowell (2011), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Hacking (1967), Hawthorne
(2004, 2012), Littlejohn (2011), Moore (1962), Stanley (2005), and Yanovich (2014).
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humans are fallible with respect to everything, or at least nearly everything, that we
believe, and “fallibilism” is sometimes used to designate this fact about us. But we
will here be interested in uses of “fallibilism” in which it instead asserts that we can
know things with respect to which we are fallible. “Intuitive fallibilism” can then be the
position that knowing some fact is compatible with being fallible with respect to that
fact in the murky-but-intuitive sense in question.
Intuitive fallibilism is our subject. Definitions of this term are best understood as what
Quine, following Carnap (1947, §2), calls “explications”: “We fix on the particular functions
of the unclear expression that make it worth troubling about, and then devise a substitute,
clear and couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions” (Quine (1960, 258–259)).
That is, the definition we seek is not an attempt to spell out what Peirce had in mind
upon introducing the term “fallibilism” into the lexicon.5 Nor do we seek to characterize
how philosophers are presently using this term. Rather, our aim is to provide a precise
characterization of “fallibilism” that captures the aspects of our intuitive conception that
epistemologists have found well worth troubling about for at least the past century, and
arguably much longer.
I begin by introducing what are now the two standard ways of glossing fallibilism:
The Evidence Gloss: Fallibilism is a thesis about the type of epistemic position con-
sistent with knowledge, e.g. that knowledge can be based on non-entailing evidence.
The Modal Gloss: Fallibilism is a thesis about the truth-conditions of sentences in-
volving typical uses of natural language epistemic modals, e.g. that CKAs are sometimes
true.
These glosses are not themselves definitions of fallibilism—they figure in definitions of falli-
bilism. More precisely: we can take each gloss to determine a property of theories. We can
then define fallibilism by using predicates that express these properties.
For example, one version of the Evidence Gloss determines the following property:
that of being a theory on which knowledge does not require entailing evidence. Let F denote
this property. We can then use this predicate to define fallibilism as follows:
5See the OED entry on “fallibilism” for examples of Peirce’s usage.
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x is a fallibilist theory =df x is F .
6
One might instead use both of our glosses to define fallibilism. Let G denote the property
of being a theory on which CKAs are sometimes true. Then define fallibilism as follows:
x is a fallibilist theory =df x is F and x is G.
I’ll discuss all of these options in more detail below. But let me first say a bit more about
the glosses themselves.
The Evidence Gloss should be familiar. On this way of characterizing fallibilism,
the view is at least in part a thesis about the strength of epistemic position required for
knowledge (the term “evidence” in the name of the gloss is simply shorthand for “epistemic
position”). For example, Stanley (2005) describes fallibilism as the view that knowledge can
be based on non-entailing evidence, while Reed (2002) describes the view as one on which
knowledge can be based on a justification that could have failed to yield knowledge.7 In
general terms, the Evidence Gloss characterizes fallibilism as a rejection of the stringent
demands on knowledge typically employed in skeptical arguments.
The Modal Gloss is perhaps less familiar. On this account, fallibilism is at least in
part a thesis about the truth-conditions of natural language epistemic modals. For example,
Worsnip (2015) describes his aim as to “vindicate a form of fallibilism that is very robust
indeed” and he clarifies his view as follows: “S can sometimes truly assert ‘it is possible
that not-p’ even though S knows that p” (Worsnip (2015, 225–226)). Similarly, Reed (2013)
claims that fallibilists are committed to the semantic consistency of CKAs like S knows that
φ, but it might be that not-φ. As he puts it: “We cannot take these kinds of CKAs to be
false in every instance without thereby rejecting fallibilism” (Reed (2013, 53).) One can also
employ the Modal Gloss by using, not mentioning epistemic modals. Consider Dougherty’s
(2011) definition of fallible knowledge:
S fallibly knows that p =df (i) S knows that p, but (ii) p might (epistemically) be false.
6Strictly speaking, this is a definition of the term “fallibilist theory”. But “fallibilism” is simply the
doctrine that some fallibilist theory is true.
7Other authors employing versions of the Evidence Gloss include Cohen (1988), Dougherty (2011),
Dougherty and Rysiew (2009), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Feldman (1981), Littlejohn (2011), Neta (2011),
and Pryor (2000).
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Trivially, if fallibilism is true, then there are metaphysically possible instances of fallible
knowledge. But on Dougherty’s definition, no one will ever have fallible knowledge if the
truth of (i) precludes the truth of (ii).8 Thus, if fallibilism is true, then epistemic modals need
to have the right kind of truth-conditions. To generalize: Dougherty, Reed, and Worsnip
are all proposing uses of the term “fallibilism” on which the view is at least in part a thesis
about the truth-conditions of natural language modals.9
Let me clarify this last point. The Modal Gloss is a way of characterizing fallibilism
by means of natural language epistemic modals on their typical use. The gloss is not an
attempt to characterize fallibilism by means of terms like “epistemic possibility”. The latter
is a philosopher’s term, not a piece of natural language. The Modal Gloss is also not an
attempt to characterize fallibilism by means of some atypical use of epistemic modals present
only in the mouth of the theorist or accessible only through some special contextual setup.
When Dougherty, Reed, and Worsnip use modals to gloss fallibilism, they instruct the reader
only to read the modals epistemically.
Still, one point of caution is in order. When assessing a proposed characterization of
fallibilism, one must take particular care to distinguish between talk of what is possible
and talk of what is possible for some subject S. The latter is ubiquitous in the literature
on fallibilism, even in contexts where theorists are ostensibly giving a semantics for natural
language possibility talk. Here is an example from Dougherty and Rysiew (2009, 127):
q is epistemically possible for S iff not-q isn’t entailed by S’s evidence.
Strictly speaking, this biconditional characterizes something called “epistemic possibility
for S”. But it is clear from the context that Dougherty and Rysiew mean to characterize
the truth-conditions of sentences like “it is possible that q”, where the modal receives an
epistemic reading. Their implicit assumption is this:
“it is possible that q” (on the epistemic reading) is true iff q is epistemically possible for
S.
8Presumably, Dougherty intends that (i) and (ii) be evaluated at the same context of use.
9See Anderson (2014), Dougherty and Rysiew (2009), Fantl and McGrath (2009), and Reed (2012) for
other examples of the Modal Gloss.
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As I’ll argue below, this assumption is actually false. But for now, I simply want to draw
attention to the fact that an assumption is being made in the first place. “possible for S”
is functioning here as a theoretically-loaded phrase that reflects a particular view about the
truth-conditions of epistemically modalized sentences—namely, that these sentences are true
relative to how things stand with some subject S.
Consider, then, (1) and (2):
(1) Fallibilism is the view that knowledge is consistent with the possibility of error.
(2) Fallibilism is the view that S can know that φ even if it is possible for S that not-φ.
(1) is a version of the Modal Gloss, if we give “possibility” its natural epistemic reading.
(2) is underspecified. If “possible for S” characterizes the state of S’s epistemic position,
then (2) counts as a version of the Evidence Gloss. But one might instead treat “possible
for S” as a kind of shorthand for natural language talk of possibility.10 In this case, (2)
counts as a version of the Modal Gloss, although we must be careful not to read “for S”
as having any theoretical significance.
Let me turn now to the question of how one might use our two glosses to define fallibilism.
I will regiment such definitions as follows. Let “E-predicates” be predicates expressing
properties determined by some version of the Evidence Gloss. Let “M-predicates” be
predicates expressing properties determined by some version of the Modal Gloss. And
define falllibilism by means of clauses with the following structure, where the right-hand side
of the clause contains some E-predicate, M-predicate, or logical combination thereof:
x is a fallibilist theory =df . . .
11
Now, there are many E-predicates and M-predicates, and thus many possible definitions
of fallibilism. My aim here is not to settle on any particular definition. Rather, I am con-
10See Worsnip (2015).
11I will assume that every term in a language receives at most one definition. So if one wishes to define
fallibilism by means of more than one predicate, all must figure in the same definition clause. Note also:
if every term receives at most one definition, then one cannot express the equivalence of two definitions
by giving multiple definitions of the same term. Strictly speaking, a judgment of equivalence should be
expressed as a thesis about the equivalence of two languages, each containing terms one takes to be defined
by co-extensive, or co-intensive predicates (say).
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cerned to assess the different views one might hold about the general shape such a definition
should take. There are five views that will be the subject of my discussion.
The first is what I will call the Equivalence Account: there are
E-predicates and M-predicates by which one can offer adequate and equivalent definitions of
fallibilism. For example, suppose one holds the following semantics for epistemic modals:
it might be that φ is true at a context-world pair <c,w> iff the c-relevant S’s evidence at
w fails to entail that not-φ.
On this semantics, epistemic modals describe how things stand with the evidence of some
contextually relevant subject. Now consider a CKA like “I know it’s raining, but it might
not be raining.” A use of this sentence plausibly makes the speaker the contextually relevant
subject. So by our above semantics, the second conjunct is true just in case the speaker’s
evidence fails to entail that it’s raining. The first conjunct is true just in case the speaker
knows it’s raining. Thus, if the entire sentence is true, then there exists an instance of
knowledge based on non-entailing evidence. In other words: any theory on which our CKA is
sometimes true will be a theory on which knowledge does not require entailing evidence, and
vice versa. Let us use our predicates F and G to denote these properties of theories. Anyone
who endorses our above semantics will then view the following definitions as equivalent:12
x is a fallibilist theory =df x is F .
x is a fallibilist theory =df x is G.
In general terms, the Equivalence Account takes fallibilism to be a thesis about a knower’s
epistemic position and the truth-conditions of epistemic modals—but the two come to the
same thing.13
Contrast the Equivalence Account with what I will call the Conjunction Account:
fallibilism can only be properly defined by means of complementary E-predicates and M-
predicates—i.e. predicates that are neither co-extensive nor mutually exclusive. For example,
suppose one denies that epistemic modals describe the state of a subject’s evidence. One
12More precisely: the definitions will be equivalent in the sense that they employ co-extensive predicates.
Also, the definitions should be read as defining terms in two different languages. See n. 11.
13Defenders of the Equivalence Account include Dougherty (2011), Dougherty and Rysiew (2009), and
Fantl and McGrath (2009).
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might still hold that fallibilism is a theory on which CKAs are sometimes true. And one
might also hold that fallibilism is a theory on which knowledge can be based on non-entailing
evidence. If one takes these claims to offer an exhaustive characterization of the fallibilist
thesis, then the resulting definition is consistent with the Conjunction Account but not
the Equivalence Account.14
Consider next what I will call the Ambiguity Account: there is no single term, “fal-
libilism”, that can be defined so as to capture the intuitions epistemologists are aiming to
characterize. There is only fallibilism1, fallibilism2, and so on, where some of these terms
are defined by E-predicates, others are defined by M-predicates, and the resulting definitions
are not equivalent.15
Our final two accounts differ from all of the above in denying that
E-predicates and M-predicates both figure in adequate definitions of fallibilism. According
to what I will call Evidence Purism, fallibilism should defined by some E-predicate(s) and
no M-predicate(s). On this account, fallibilism just is a thesis about the type of epistemic
position consistent with knowledge. This is the view I will defend in this paper.16
One might instead hold that fallibilism should be defined by some
M-predicate(s) and no E-predicate(s). I will call this view Modal Purism. On this ac-
count, fallibilism just is a thesis about the truth-conditions of sentences involving typical
uses of natural language epistemic modals.17
To sum up, the two standard glosses on fallibilism allow for at least five general accounts
of how to formulate the view:
14I take Reed (2013) to endorse a version of the Conjunction Account. See also Littlejohn (2011).
15It’s not clear that any authors actually endorse the Ambiguity Account. Worsnip (2015) comes the
closest. He seems to distinguish between a “robust” vs. a “less ambitious” formulation of fallibilism, where
the former is characterized by an M-predicate, while the latter is characterized by an E-predicate. However,
he seems to recognize only the former as capturing what he describes as the “core insight” behind fallibilism
(Worsnip (2015, 225)). So he is perhaps best understood as endorsing what I call Modal Purism below.
16Leite (2010) and Stanley (2005) also endorse Evidence Purism.
17Worsnip (2015) seems to endorse Modal Purism; see n. 15. Lewis (1996) is typically read this way as
well. But it’s not clear that Lewis intends to characterize fallibilism by means of natural language epistemic
modals. He describes fallibilism as the view that knowledge is compatible with “uneliminated possibilities of
error” (Lewis (1996, 549)). But here the word “possibilities” is simply functioning as a noun that denotes a
set of metaphysically possible worlds—namely, those in which the putatively known proposition is false. If the
subject cannot eliminate these possibilities, the theorist might describe these possibilities as “epistemic”—
and Lewis does. But as I cautioned above, we must be careful to distinguish between theoretical talk of
“epistemic possibility” and natural language talk of what is possible, in the epistemic sense. Lewis never
characterizes fallibilism by means of natural language sentences containing the words “possible” or “might”.
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The Equivalence Account: Fallibilism is a thesis about a knower’s epistemic position
and the truth-conditions of epistemic modals—but the two come to the same thing.
The Conjunction Account: Fallibilism is a thesis about a knower’s epistemic position
and the truth-conditions of epistemic modals—but the two do not come to the same
thing.
The Ambiguity Account: “Fallibilism” is ambiguous between a thesis about (i) a
knower’s epistemic position, and (ii) a thesis about the truth-conditions of epistemic
modals.
Evidence Purism: Fallibilism is just a thesis about a knower’s epistemic position.
Modal Purism: Fallibilism is just a thesis about the truth-conditions of epistemic
modals.
I argue below in favor of Evidence Purism.
4.3 THE SEMANTICS OF EPISTEMIC MODALS
I will argue for Evidence Purism by first setting out the problems facing the competing
accounts. All of these problems have a common source: namely, an erroneous picture of the
semantics of epistemic modals.
It is widely held that epistemic modals have a kind of mentalistic semantics on which they
describe what people know, or what people know with certainty, or the state of their evidence,
and so on.18 In general terms: it is thought that epistemic modals describe epistemic states.
My aim in this section is to show that this semantics is false: epistemic modals have no
default function where they describe anyone’s epistemic state. In the next section I draw
out the consequences of this point, showing how it undermines all of the competing accounts
of fallibilism except for Evidence Purism.
It is not surprising that the literature on fallibilism is dominated by the assumption
that epistemic modals have a mentalistic semantics. This type of semantics is arguably the
18See the references in n. 4 for examples of such theories.
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orthodox view of the matter, going back at least to G.E. Moore. Here is how Moore states
the view:
People in philosophy say: The propositions that I’m not sitting down now, that I’m not
male, that I’m dead, that I died before the murder of Julius Caesar, that I shall die
before 12 tonight are ‘logically possible’. But it’s not English to say, with this meaning:
It’s possible that I’m not sitting down now etc.—this only means ‘It is not certain that
I am’ or ‘I don’t know that I am’ (Moore (1962, 184); his emphasis).
Moore offers what has become known as a contextualist account of epistemic modals: it’s
possible that φ expresses different propositions on different occasions of use. If Bill uses
this sentence, it expresses a proposition about what he knows; if Mary uses the sentence,
it expresses a propostion about what she knows, and so on. Since Moore takes modalized
sentences to express propositions about epistemic states, I will classify his theory as a version
of what I will call Mentalistic Contextualism: the proposition expressed by a modalized
sentence is true at a world w depending on how things stand with some contextually rel-
evant subject or group’s epistemic state at w. On such a theory, “possible” always means
“possible for S”, where S is the contextually relevant subject or group whose epistemic state
is described by the proposition expressed by the sentence. As Stanley (2005, 127) puts it:
“Since knowledge requires a knower, epistemic possibility does as well.”
One might instead offer a mentalistic semantics in a relativist framework. On the latter,
it might be that φ does not describe how things stand with any particular S’s epistemic
state. Rather, a use of the sentence expresses a general property an information state
might have, and so the formal object expressed by the sentence is true relative to some
information states and false relative to others. For example, on Egan’s (2007) relativism,
it might be that φ is true relative to a particular individual just in case the evidence within
the individual’s “epistemic reach” is compatible with φ. Egan’s theory is a version of what
I will call Mentalistic Relativism: the information state at which a modal claim is true
is a state of information that is present in or somehow connected to the knowledge, certain
knowledge, evidence, etc. of some individual or group.
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We have, then, two different types of mentalistic semantics for epistemic modals—one
based in a contextualist framework, the other based in a relativist framework. I will now
argue that both are mistaken.
My argument draws on linguistic data first noted by Seth Yalcin (Yalcin (2007, 2011)).
Yalcin’s observations have been widely discussed in the larger literature on epistemic modals.
But his work has yet to be discussed by epistemologists working on subjects informed by the
semantics of epistemic modals. As we’ll see, Yalcin’s data is of great significance for how to
theorize about fallibilism. But the true strength of his observations will only become clear
when juxtaposed with some additional data I introduce below.
Yalcin’s key observation is that there is a difference between Moore-paradoxical sentences
like φ but I don’t know that φ and what Yalcin calls epistemic contradictions—e.g. φ but it
might be that not-φ. Consider:
(3) # It’s raining, but I don’t know it’s raining.19
(4) # It’s raining, but it might not be raining.
(5) Suppose it’s raining, but I don’t know it’s raining.
(6) # Suppose it’s raining, but it might not be raining.
As (3) and (4) illustrate, Moore-paradoxical sentences and epistemic contradictions are both
bad things to assert. However, (5) and (6) show that there is a clear contrast in the em-
bedding behavior of these sentences: it’s perfectly coherent to merely entertain a Moore-
paradoxical sentence, while epistemic contradictions continue to sound defective even in
suppositional environments.
Nothing turns on the fact that (3) and (5) describe the speaker’s knowledge. The contrast
persists even if we vary the type of epistemic state or the subject whose epistemic state it is:
(6) # Suppose it’s raining, but it might not be raining.
(7) Suppose it’s raining, but I don’t have any evidence for thinking that it’s raining.
(8) Suppose it’s raining, but I’m not certain that it’s raining.
(9) Suppose it’s raining, but none of the forecasters knows that it’s raining.
19“#” marks sentences that are grammatical but infelicitous.
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All of this constitutes a straightforward problem for Mentalistic Contextualism: if epis-
temic modals express propositions about epistemic states, then why is there a clear contrast
in the embeddability of epistemic contradictions and Moore-paradoxical sentences?
The data is also a problem for Mentalistic Relativism, although this point has not
been discussed in the literature. Recall Egan’s semantics from above: it might be that φ
is true relative to a particular individual just in case the evidence within the individual’s
“epistemic reach” is compatible with φ. Consider, then, the state of mind of believing it
might be that φ: to believe this claim is to believe that the evidence within one’s epistemic
reach is compatible with φ.20 Similarly, to suppose it might be that φ is to suppose that the
evidence within one’s epistemic reach is compatible with φ. But then why is it incoherent to
suppose an epistemic contradiction? On Egan’s semantics, this state of mind would just be
one in which one supposes that φ is true but that the evidence within one’s epistemic reach
is compatible with not-φ.21
The recent literature contains several attempts to accommodate Yalcin’s data in the
framework of a mentalistic semantics.22 Here are the three main strategies:
(i) Challenge the data.
(ii) Claim that the data results from the special contextual flexibility of epistemic modals.
(iii) Claim that the data results from general-purpose domain restriction mechanisms.
I take each strategy in turn.
On the first, some authors claim we can get a felicitous reading of embedded epistemic
contradictions with the right contextual setup, or perhaps by reversing the order of the
conjuncts. I have no qualm with these points. But they don’t address the original data:
Why do we need any special setup to get a felicitous reading in the first place? No such setup
is needed to access a felicitous reading of embedded Moore-paradoxical sentences. Dowell
(ms.) objects that the original data is unreliable because we haven’t been given any context
for interpreting the sentences. But in fact, the effect persists even if we do add some context:
20Egan himself is explicit on this point. See Egan (2007, 9).
21The data is also a problem for MacFarlane’s relativism, but it takes a bit more work to set this out. I
return to this point below when discussing Yalcin’s semantics. See n. 29.
22See Crabill (2013), Dorr and Hawthorne (2013), Dowell (ms.), Ninan (forthcoming), Silk (2017), Sorensen
(2009), Stojnic´ (2016, forthcoming), and Yanovich (2014).
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John lives in a town where there has been an outbreak of a virus. Often times those
infected with the virus initially show no symptoms.
(10) Imagine a scenario in which John is infected, but he doesn’t know he’s infected.
(11) # Imagine a scenario in which John is infected, but he might not be infected.
(12) # Imagine a scenario in which John is infected, but he is not infected.
There is a clear contrast between the acceptibility of (10) and (11). So denying the data is
not a promising strategy.
On strategies two and three, one concedes that embedded epistemic contradictions sound
bad and that this reveals something important about the semantics of epistemic modals. But
one attempts to explain the data in the context of a mentalistic semantics.
On strategy two, one attempts to explain the data by the contextual flexibility of epis-
temic modals. For example, some claim that epistemic modals exhibit such a great deal
of contextual flexibility that it’s hard to understand whose epistemic state is at issue in
suppositional contexts.23 It is argued that epistemic modals can characterize the epistemic
state of the speaker, some other subject, or even some relevant group. It is then claimed
that assertions of modalized sentence perhaps default to describing the speaker’s epistemic
state—but not suppositions. After all, we have wide latitude in what we chose to merely
entertain. So if we’re not given any contextual pointers for whose epistemic state matters,
this may explain why embedded epistemic contradictions behave differently than explicit
descriptions of people’s epistemic states, as in embedded Moore-paradoxical sentences.
Strategy three works in the opposition direction. Here one claims that the modal does
receive a clear reading. But one argues that this reading makes the sentence as a whole
express a literal contradiction. To see how this explanation works, note that modals are
typically understood as quantifiers whose domains are restricted by contextually relevant
propositions: it might be that φ is true at a context just in case the set of worlds compatible
with the contextually relevant propositions contains at least one world at which φ is true.24
Now recall the form of an epistemic contradiction: φ but might not-φ. If the proposition
23See Crabill (2013) and Dorr and Hawthorne (2013). Dorr and Hawthorne’s (2013) account has various
additional wrinkles that I won’t be able to address here. See Chapter 3, Marushak and Shaw (ms.), and Silk
(2017) for discussion of the problems facing their view.
24See Kratzer (1977, 1981, 2012) for the canonical semantics.
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expressed by φ restricts the domain of the modal, then there will be no not-φ worlds in the
modal’s domain, and so the second conjunct—and hence the entire sentence—is guaranteed
to be false. Authors defending this explanation typically rely on general-purpose domain
restriction effects to account for why this restriction effect occurs in the case of epistemic
contradictions.25 For instance, Silk (2017) and Stojnic´ (2016, forthcoming) both claim that
the effect essentially results from a phenomenon known as “local accommodation”, wherein
material later in a sentence is interpreted in light of material earlier in the sentence. So
even if the modal by default describes some epistemic state, the first conjunct adds a further
proposition that renders the sentence contradictory. No such effect is possible in the case
of a Moore-paradoxical sentence. Here the second conjunct is just an explicit description
of what someone knows. And the latter has no domain that can be restricted by material
earlier in the sentence.
Strategies two and three succeed in identifying mechanisms that could account for Yal-
cin’s data. But this virtue turns out to be a vice. Consider:
(13) All of the evidence points to Smith.
This sentence is context-sensitive: it expresses different propositions on different occasions of
use. And the contextually flexibility is wide indeed. If uttered by a juror, (13) might express
the proposition that the evidence presented to the jury points to Smith. If uttered by a
detective, (13) might express the proposition that some larger body of evidence, available
only to the detectives, points to Smith. And if Smith is on trial for two different crimes, uses
of (13) might express propositions about completely unrelated bodies of evidence.
Note also: to assert (13) is to describe how things stand with someone’s epistemic state.
Evidence itself may consist of propositions, or even physical stuff that can be placed in an
evidence locker. But when one uses (13) in assertion, one describes the evidence someone
has or possesses. It is universally agreed that this sort of “having” or “possession” relation
is somehow epistemic: it concerns some sort of access the subject enjoys to the evidence
itself.26 Thus, to use (13) is to describe how things stand with someone’s epistemic state.
25Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) is the exception. Again, see Chapter 3, Marushak and Shaw (ms.), and Silk
(2017) for discussion.
26See Comesan˜a and McGrath (2014), Henning (2014), Hornsby (2008), Lord (2010, 2015), Neta (2008b,
2011), Schroeder (2008, 2011), and Skorupski (2010, 108).
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Now, consider how (13) embeds:
(14) Suppose Jones is the murderer, but all of the evidence points to Smith.
This sentence sounds perfectly fine. It is easy to understand what it means: we are asked to
imagine a scenario in which Jones is actually the murderer but the evidence available to some
individual or group is misleading and points to Smith. That is, (13) continues to describe
epistemic states even when embedded. By hypothesis, Jones is the murderer, but this piece of
information is not counted among the relevant evidence even though we are quantifying over
“all” of the evidence and the quantifer is placed immediately after the sentence describing
Jones as the murderer. What this shows is that there is a clear default for reading talk of “all
of the evidence” as describing the evidence people “have” or “possess”. To merely suppose
that Jones is the murderer is not to suppose that anyone knows this or has any evidence
for thinking it’s true. This is why Jones’s being the murderer does not figure as part of the
relevant evidence described in the second conjunct.
Return now to our second and third strategies for explaining the epistemic contradic-
tion data. Recall that these strategies appeal to the following claims: embedded epistemic
contradictions sound bad because (a) it’s not clear whose epistemic state is at issue; (b) the
first conjunct restricts the domain of the modal in the second.
However, (14) runs counter to the predictions of each of these theories. Regarding (a),
talk of “all of the evidence” exhibits wide contextual flexibility, this language continues to
describe epistemic states even when embedded, and we are given no contextual cues for
whose epistemic state is at issue. But (14) sounds perfectly fine.
Regarding (b), talk of “all of the evidence” has a domain that can be restricted by
information described earlier in a sentence. “all of the evidence” literally contains a quantifier
that is ranging over bodies of information—here, bodies of evidence. And yet, the first
conjunct of (14) does not restrict the domain of the quantifier in the second. That is,
(14) does not ask us to entertain a scenario in which Jones is the murderer but all of the
evidence—including the fact that Jones is the murderer—points to Smith.
Thus, we have a dilemma: strategies two and three either generate false predictions, or
they fail to explain Yalcin’s data in the first place. That is, the theories as stated predict
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that (14) should sound bad, but it doesn’t. However, if these theories are adjusted to block
this prediction, then it’s not clear how they can explain the infelicity of embedded epistemic
contradictions in the first place. After all, evidence claims have exactly the sort of semantic
profile that a mentalistic semantics attributes to modal claims. So it would seem that one
either predicts that both are fine to embed, or both are not. But neither outcome is correct.
Importantly, this isn’t some isolated problem facing only strategies two and three. This
is a general problem facing any attempt to give a pragmatic explanation of the epistemic
contradiction data within the framework of a mentalistic semantics. If epistemic modals
have the same semantic profile as talk of “all of the evidence”, then it’s hard to see how any
pragmatics could explain the difference in their embedding behavior. Both expressions will
be contextually flexible characterizations of epistemic states. So it’s hard to see what sort
of pragmatics could possibly engage with one type of language but not the other so as to
predict their difference in embedding behavior.27
All of this seems to show that epistemic modals are not in the business of describing
epistemic states. There are many expressions in our language that clearly have this function.
But these expressions do not embed like epistemic modals.
What, then, is the semantics of epistemic modals? I will briefly sketch two proposals
that avoid the problems just raised for mentalistic semantics. The first is the proposal that
Yalcin himself advances to explain the data. Yalcin’s is an expressivist semantics: epistemic
modals have no descriptive function at all.28 They simply express features of a speaker’s
state of mind. For example, to assert “it might be that φ” is to express the compatibility
of φ with one’s belief state as a whole. Similarly, to believe a modal claim is not to believe
some proposition about anyone’s epistemic state—it’s just a matter of being in a doxastic
state whose content is compatible with φ.
This account of the state of mind of accepting an epistemic modal explains the infelicity
of supposing φ but might not-φ. To suppose that φ is to get into an information state that
contains only φ-worlds. But to suppose that might not-φ is to get into an information state
that contains at least some not-φ worlds. No coherent information state has both properties,
27See Chapter 3 for discussion of an analogous problem concerning the language of epistemic reasons.
28For other examples of expressivism about epistemic modals, see Moss (2013, 2015) Rothschild (2012),
and Swanson (2006, 2011).
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which explains why it sounds odd to request that one enter such a state.29 Importantly, it is
open for Yalcin and other expressivists that hold that talk of “all of the evidence” does not
have a similar expressivist semantics. This semantic difference can then explain the contrast
in embedding data.30
An alternative proposal is what I will call veritic semantics : epistemic modals have a
descriptive function, but the information they describe is not restricted to information con-
nected to anyone’s epistemic state. On this semantics, epistemic modals simply characterize
relevant truths.31 For example, “it might rain tonight” may simply describe the relevant
meteorological facts as being compatible with rain. The sentence therefore expresses a
proposition that is true at a world depending on how things stand with the meteorologi-
cal facts at that world. Of course, it may turn out that the speaker knows the relevant facts
at the world of the context of use—indeed, it may be inappropriate for the speaker to assert
the sentence unless she knows the relevant facts. But this does not mean that the sentence
describes the speaker’s knowledge: there will be worlds at which the speaker fails to know
the relevant facts, but the truth of the modal at such worlds still just turns on whether rain
is compatible with the meteorological facts at those worlds. Compare a sentence like It’s
raining : it may be inappropriate for a speaker to assert this sentence unless she knows it’s
raining, but this does not mean that the sentence itself describes how things stand with the
speaker’s knowledge.
Veritic semantics offers a different explanation of the epistemic contradiction data. Re-
call the form of an epistemic contradiction: φ but might not-φ. To suppose that φ is to
suppose that φ is true. But the modal in the second conjunct of an epistemic contradiction
29Herein lies the problem for MacFarlane’s version of Mentalistic Relativism. MacFarlane and Yalcin
endorse the same compositional semantics for epistemic modals: both take might φ to express a property of
an information state s that is true of s iff s is compatible with φ. But MacFarlane explicitly rejects Yalcin’s
account of the state of mind of accepting might φ (see MacFarlane (2014, 278–279)). MacFarlane takes it to
be a problem for Yalcin that the state of believing an epistemic contradiction is “conceptually impossible”,
as MacFarlane puts it (again, see MacFarlane (2014, 278–279)). He wishes to allow for the possibility of such
that states of belief while deeming them irrational, and he appeals to norms on belief to secure the latter
judgment. But what norms on supposition make it irrational to merely suppose an epistemic contradiction?
On MacFarlane’s own semantics, to suppose such the latter should just be to entertain a context of assessment
wherein φ is true but the contextually relevant state of knowledge is compatible with not-φ. So MacFarlane
can’t explain the epistemic contradiction data in the first place.
30However, see Chapter 3 for some larger problems with this strategy.
31See Marushak and Shaw (ms.) and Chapter 3 for development and defense of this theory.
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is characterizing how things stand with relevant truths. We should therefore expect the
proposition that φ to count as part of the information characterized by the modal. But then
the second conjunct comes out false, for the relevant information cannot be compatible with
not-φ if the relevant information contains the information that φ.
Veritic semantics exploits a simple parallel with other cases of domain restriction. Con-
sider:
(15) Suppose John’s marble is blue, but every marble is red.
This request strikes us as incoherent, since there can be no such scenario. The first conjunct
restricts the domain of the quantifier in the second: “every marble” includes John’s marble,
so any scenario in which the first conjunct is true is a scenario in which the second conjunct
is false. Notice that these domain restriction effects hold only at a context in which the
sentences are both used together. There are many contexts where “every marble is red”
is true, but “John’s marble is blue” is also true because the John’s marble is not salient
in the context and so fails to be included in the quantifier domain. In other words, there
is no semantic defect in sentences like “John’s marble is blue, but every marble is red”.
The defect is pragmatic and concerns the fact that the entire sentence typically expresses a
contradiction at a given context of use.
The same goes for epistemic contradictions, on veritic semantics. The modal is quantify-
ing over relevant truths, and the first conjunct makes φ is salient as being true, so φ restricts
the domain of the subsequent modal. Again, the domain restriction effect occurs only at a
context in which the sentence is used. There are many contexts at which “it might be that
not-φ” and φ are both true since φ need not restrict the domain of the modal unless it is
salient as being true.
This semantics can also account for the difference in the embedding behavior of evidence-
talk. Recall our example from above:
(16) Suppose Jones is the murderer, but all of the evidence points to Smith.
If talk of “all of the evidence” is by default functioning to describe bodies of possessed
evidence, then the information that Jones is the murderer will not on its own restrict the
domain of the quantifier. So the difference between the embedding behavior of modal talk
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and evidence talk lies in the fact that the former by default characterizes relevant truths,
while the latter by default characterizes relevant epistemic states.32 The key point here is
that the veritic explanation of the epistemic contradiction data does not rely on general
purpose domain restriction mechanisms. The explanation relies on the fact that modals are
by default characterizing mere truths. So if evidence talk does not have such a semantics,
it’s not surprising that it fails to display the embedding behavior of modal talk.
4.4 FALLIBILISM AND EPISTEMIC MODALS
I’ve just argued that epistemic modals have no default function where they describe how
things stand with anyone’s epistemic state. And I set out two alternative semantics: a
veritic semantics, on which epistemic modals describe how things stand with facts that need
not be related to anyone’s epistemic state, and an expressivist semantics, on which epistemic
modals perform no descriptive function at all. I will now apply these semantics to the
question of how one ought to formulate fallibilism.
4.4.1 Problems for the Equivalence Account
It is an immediate consequence of the semantics I’ve offerred that the Equivalence Account
is false. On this account, fallibilism can be equivalently characterized as both a thesis about
the type of epistemic position consistent with knowledge and the semantics of epistemic
modals, on their default use. But the default use of epistemic modals does not function to
express propositions about how things stand with anyone’s epistemic position. So claims
about the semantics of epistemic modals are not equivalent to claims about the type of
epistemic position consistent with knowledge.
For example, suppose one wishes to characterize a fallibilist theory as one on which CKAs
are sometimes true. Veritic semantics will then count as a fallibilist theory, for this semantics
entails no semantic defect in CKAs. Instead, the defect in typical CKAs is pragmatic: their
32See Chapter 3 for further discussion.
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infelicity results from the fact that CKAs entail epistemic contradictions, and familiar domain
restriction effects tend to make the latter express contradictions.33 A true CKA requires only
that there be a context in which the putatively known proposition fails to restrict the domain
of the modal. It may prove difficult to construct such a context, but nothing in our semantics
rules this out. Suppose, then, that there is such a context in which a CKA is true. What
follows about the type of epistemic position consistent with knowledge? Answer: nothing.
A context in which a CKA is true will be one in which S knows that φ but it is compatible
with the relevant truths that not-φ. But nothing in the semantics forces these relevant truths
to concern how things stand with S’s epistemic position. So nothing follows about whether
the context is one in which S has fallible knowledge, in the Evidence Gloss sense of the
phrase.
4.4.2 Problems for Modal Purism and the Ambiguity Account
According to Modal Purism and the Ambiguity Account, fallibilism—or at least one
sense of “fallibilism”—ought to be characterized in exclusively modal terms. This is an odd
proposal. Consider Worsnip’s characterization of fallibilism quoted above: “S can sometimes
truly assert ‘it is possible that not-p’ even though S knows that p” (Worsnip (2015, 226)). On
this formulation, fallibilism is simply equivalent to the negation of what Egan, Hawthorne
and Weatherson (2005) call the “speaker inclusion constraint”: “whenever S truly utters a
might be F, S does not know that a is not F ” (Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson (2005,
135)). Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson themselves argue against this constraint—and
hence in favor of fallibilism, on Worsnip’s characterization of the view. Here is the type of
example they press against the constraint:
Tom is stuck in a maze. Sally knows the way out, and knows she knows this, but doesn’t
want to tell Tom. Tom asks whether the exit is to the left. Sally says, ‘It might be. It
might not be.’ Sally might be being unhelpful here, but it isn’t clear that she is lying. Yet
if the speaker-inclusion constraint applies to unembedded epistemic modals, then Sally is
33Worsnip (2015) offers a similar account of the infelicity of CKAs. I explain the key difference below in
§4.5.
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clearly saying something that she knows to be false, for she knows that she knows which
way is out (Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson (2005, 140)).
Now, Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson are themselves cautious about just how much this
example shows. But suppose the case works and falsifies the speaker inclusion constraint.
Would anyone take this to vindicate fallibilism in any recognizable sense of the term? Ob-
viously not. All we would have learned is that speakers can use epistemic modals to charac-
terize the limited information available to some poorly informed third party. But fallibilism
is manifestly not a view about that.
Perhaps we need to try characterizing fallibilism by a different version of the Modal
Gloss: suppose fallibilism just is the view that CKAs are sometimes true, where this is
not equivalent to any claim about how things stand with anyone’s epistemic position. As
noted above, our veritic semantics will count as a fallibilist theory on this construal. But
notice: expressivism will not. For one, the notion of truth is not entirely applicable to uses
of epistemic modals on the expressivist picture, as modals do not serve to describe what the
world is like. More importantly, expressivism is a view on which CKAs do suffer from a
kind of semantic defect—namely, the same defect that aﬄicts epistemic contradictions. We
reviewed this defect above when stating Yalcin’s explanation of the epistemic contradiction
data: no coherent information state can accept both conjuncts of an epistemic contradiction.
And since CKAs entail epistemic contradictions, the same goes for CKAs. Here, then, is the
upshot of our proposed characterization of fallibilism: veritic semantics is a fallibilist theory,
but expressivism is not.
Is this a reasonable characterization of the fallibilist thesis, on any sense of the term?
Again, obviously not. The difference between these semantics is an important issue in the
philosophy of language. But these issues would appear to have nothing to do with the
nature of knowledge, skepticism, and so on. To be clear: I am not claiming that issue of
which semantics is correct will have no interesting downstream epistemological consequences.
Perhaps it does. The point is simply that it’s difficult to see how any of this has anything
to do with what made epistemologists interested in fallibilism in the first place.
For example, fallibilism is typically thought to block skeptical arguments like the follow-
ing:
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P1. Knowledge requires entailing evidence.
P2. No one has entailing evidence for anything.
C. No one knows anything.
In particular, fallibilism is typically thought to block P1. But fallibilism can’t block P1 unless
it is at least in part a thesis about the type of epistemic position consistent with knowledge.
Here, then, is another way of putting the argument in this section: fallibilism is widely
thought to be one of the main strategies for responding to skepticism. But it’s not obvious
how a very subtle point in semantics—i.e. whether CKAs are semantically defective, or only
contradictory at typical contexts—could capture what epistemologists have been trying to
get at by developing a fallibilist response to skepticism.
4.4.3 Problems for the Conjunction Account
Considerations like the above might lead one to favor the Conjunction Account. Recall
that on this account, fallibilism is a thesis about a knower’s epistemic position and the
truth-conditions of epistemic modals—but the two do not come to the same thing. This
account might appear to offer the best of both worlds: we maintain a connection between
fallibilism and ordinary talk of possibility, while at the same time building in some properly
epistemological content that serves our anti-skeptical ends.
To be sure, the Conjunction Account makes fallibilism an epistemologically important
view. But there is now a different problem: by building in a modal element, the view
makes the truth of fallibilism turn on irrelevant matters. Recall the point from above:
veritic semantics will count as a fallibilist theory on a common modal characterization, while
expressivism will not. Suppose expressivism is correct. Fallibilism itself then turns out to
be false on the Conjunction Account, since the view entails a claim about the semantic
consistency of CKAs (say). This is an odd result. As we discussed above, the difference
between each semantics has nothing to do with the nature of knowledge or skepticism. So
the issue of which is true should not decide the fate of fallibilism itself. In other words,
the Conjunction Account may appear to be a weakening of the problematic claims we
saw with the Modal Account. But the problems just re-appear, since the Conjunction
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Account still leaves fallibilism with commitments about the semantics of epistemic modals,
even if these commitments do not exhaust the content of the view.
4.4.4 In Favor of Evidence Purism
We’ve arrived at the view that I favor. The advantages of Evidence Purism are straight-
forward. On this account, fallibilism is clearly an epistemologically significant thesis. The
view is a claim about the type of epistemic position consistent with knowledge—e.g. that
knowledge can be based on non-entailing evidence. Such a view has obvious anti-skeptical
purport, so it matters greatly whether this view is true. In addition, Evidence Purism pre-
supposes the correct semantics for epistemic modals: there is no default use of these modals
that characterizes epistemic states, so there can be no equivalent Modal Gloss formulation
of fallibilism. And by separating the fallibilist thesis from any commitments about epistemic
modals, we avoid all of the problems facing the other formulations.
4.5 HOW NOT TO ARGUE ABOUT FALLIBILISM
Getting clearer on the semantics of epistemic modals helps us understand what fallibilism is.
But we also learn things about how to argue about whether the view is true. In particular,
we learn that many prominent arguments—both for and against fallibilism—fail to hit their
mark.
I begin with what is perhaps the most widely discussed argument against the fallibilism:
namely, the argument from the infelicity of CKAs.34 As we noted above, CKAs typically
sound odd and contradictory: e.g. “I know it’s raining, but it might not be raining.” This
is supposed to be a problem for fallibilism because CKAs plausibly describe instances of
fallible knowledge.
34This argument is typically attributed to Lewis (1996), but I am skeptical for the reasons set out in
n. 17. For discussion of the CKA objection to fallibilism, see Anderson (2014), Dodd (2010), Dougherty
and Rysiew (2009), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Leite (2010), Littlejohn (2011), Reed (2013), Rysiew (2001),
Stanley (2005), and Worsnip (2015).
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If fallibilism is at least in part the thesis that CKAs are sometimes true, then this is
at least a good prima facie objection. But I’ve already argued against this conception of
fallibilism above. Suppose instead that fallibilism is a thesis about the epistemic position
consistent with knowledge. Now the CKA objection fails to hit the mark: the characteristic
function of epistemic modals is not to describe anyone’s epistemic position or other epistemic
state. On the semantics I’ve defended in this paper, typical CKAs just express ordinary
contradictions because the first conjunct restricts the domain of the modal in the second
(both veritic semantics and expressivism yield this result, although by different means). So
typical CKAs do not describe instances of fallible knowledge.
Worsnip (2015) offers a similar reply on behalf of the fallibilist. He claims that assertions
update subsequent modal bases, and so again, the first conjunct of a CKA restricts the
domain of the modal in the second conjunct and the sentence expresses a contradiction.
However, there is a key advantage to the veritic and expressivist explanations: neither relies
on features of the speech act of assertion.35 Consider:
(17) # Suppose I know it’s raining, but it might not be raining.
This sentence sounds just as bad as an unembedded CKA, even though neither conjunct
is asserted.36 A simple explanation is the following: the defect of typical CKAs ultimately
stems from the fact that they entail epistemic contradictions. Once we have an explanation
of the infelicity of embedded epistemic contradictions, we can capture the CKA data in its
full generality.
Let me turn now to another recent argument against fallibilism. Dodd (2011) offers what
appears to be a straightforward derivation of the claim that knowledge requires epistemic
probability 1, where epistemic probability is the probability of a proposition given one’s
epistemic position. His argument has two premises:
P1. φ is epistemically possible for S only if S doesn’t know the contradictory of φ to be true.
35This is also an advantage in comparison to the pragmatic explanations offerred by Dougherty and Rysiew
(2009), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Littlejohn (2011), and Rysiew (2001). All appeal to Gricean pragmatics,
which has no easy application in suppositional environments.
36Note that Worsnip cannot simply reply that suppositions update modal bases. Were he to make this
move, he would face the same problem we raised in §4.3 against appealing to general-purpose domain
restriction mechanisms to explain the infelicity of embedded epistemic contradictions.
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P2. If the epistemic probability of φ on S’s epistemic position is greater than 0, then φ is
epistemically possible for S.
C. If S knows that φ, then the epistemic probability of φ on S’s epistemic position equals
1.
This is a valid argument. By P2 and P1, we have the following:
P3. If the epistemic probability of φ on S’s epistemic position is greater than 0, then S
doesn’t know the contradictory of φ to be true.
By contraposition, we have the following:
P4. If S knows that not-φ, then the epistemic probability of φ on S’s epistemic position is
not greater than 0.
The probability calculus then gives us this:
P5. If S knows that not-φ, then the epistemic probability of φ on S’s epistemic position is
equal to 0.
From which we conclude the following, again by the probability calculus:
C. If S knows that not-φ, then the epistemic probability of not-φ on S’s epistemic position
equals 1.
Let us first consider P1, repeated here:
P1. φ is epistemically possible for S only if S doesn’t know the contradictory of φ to be true.
This premise contains the troublesome phrase “epistemically possible for S”. Dodd is explicit
that this is a theoretical term, but he argues for P1 by means of intuitions about natural
language talk of possibility. Thus, if “epistemic possibility for S” is answerable to our
ordinary use of epistemic modals, P1 is false: as I’ve already argued, epistemic modals do
not have truth-conditions that concern how things stand with what people know.
Suppose we instead read P1 as a claim about some thing—epistemic possibility—that
needn’t line up with how we talk about possibility in natural language. There is clearly a
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sense of epistemic possibility that concerns what is compatible with a subject’s knowledge.
So P1 is plausible on this reading. However, P2 now becomes question-begging:
P2. If the epistemic probability of φ on S’s epistemic position is greater than 0, then φ is
epistemically possible for S.
On the proposed reading of “epistemic possibility”, P2 claims that if φ has non-zero epistemic
probability, then φ is compatible with what S knows. But why should a fallibilist grant this
premise? Many fallibilists literally employ a version of the Evidence Gloss on which
fallible knowledge is consistent with a merely high epistemic probability of truth.37 So these
authors will all claim that one’s knowledge rules out many propositions that have non-zero
epistemic probability. Thus, Dodd faces a dilemma: his argument is either unsound or
question-begging.
I turn finally to Worsnip’s (2015, 238–239) recent argument in favor of fallibilism. He
claims that the felicity of dialogues like the following suggests that fallibilism is true:
A: Do you know what the capital of South Africa is?
B: Yes, I think I know the answer to your question—Pretoria. But it might be Johannes-
burg.38
Worsnip’s thought is this: suppose it is true in the imagined scenario that B knows the
capital is Pretoria. We would then have a case where S knows that φ but S can truly assert
that it is possible that not-φ. Hence, there exists fallible knowledge.
However, we’ve already seen in §4.4.2 that this is a bizarre characterization of fallible
knowledge. Recall the example discussed in that section: suppose I know how to get out of
a maze but I don’t want to tell you, and so I say “The exit might be to the left, and it might
to the right”. Even if we could establish that this was a genuine case of truly asserting the
possibility of not-φ while knowing that φ, no one would conclude that we had established
anything of epistemological significance.
Worsnip’s only recourse is to argue that the above dialogue contains some special use
of an epistemic modal on which it describes B’s epistemic position. We would then have
37See, for instance, Dougherty (2011), Dougherty and Rysiew (2009), Fantl and McGrath (2009), and
Reed (2012).
38This example comes from Worsnip (2015, 232).
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a case where B knows that φ but B’s evidence (say) leaves open the possibility of not-
φ. However, it’s not clear why we should grant that the modal receives such a reading in
this case. In saying “it might be Johannesburg”, B might just be asserting the following
proposition: “given my track record in geography, the answer might be Johannesburg.” We
can even concede that B describes some aspect of her epistemic position: “given my feeling
of uncertainty, the answer might be Johannesburg.” But all will concede that one can know
that φ even if some limited aspect of one’s epistemic position fails to guarantee that φ is
true. What matters is whether knowledge is consistent with one’s entire epistemic position
failing to guarantee that φ is true. Thus, without further argumentation, Worsnip’s example
shows nothing of epistemological significance.
In sum: fallibilism is neither in whole nor in part a thesis about the truth-conditions
of epistemic modals. Fallibilism is an epistemologically interesting thesis about the type of
epistemic position consistent with knowledge. Epistemic modals have no default function
where they describe anyone’s epistemic position. So there is no straightforward way to rely
on data about epistemic modals to help us determine whether fallibilism is true.
4.6 CONCLUSION
I’ve argued that the methodology that presently dominates the literature on fallibilism cannot
succeed in helping us determine whether the view is actually true. How, then, should we
proceed?
The most conservative strategy is to continue relying on data about epistemic modals,
while exercising greater care to force readings where they target someone’s epistemic position.
This is not an easy task. As we saw above in connection with Worsnip’s case, there are
many readings of modals—even mentalistic readings—that fail to precisely target a subject’s
epistemic position. Of course, one could always force the desired reading by a restrictor
phrase:
(18) I know the animal is a zebra, but given only the evidence on the basis of which I know
this fact, it might be a painted mule.
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But no one has intuitions about sentences like these—or rather, the intuitions one does
have are liable to simply reflect one’s antecedent theoretical committments for or against
fallibilism.
An alternative strategy would be to focus on examples that do not contain epistemic
modals at all. Fallibilism is sometimes thought to face problems from Gettier cases and
lottery cases.39 With regard to the former, it might appear that fallibilists are inevitably
stuck with the view that knowledge requires a kind of luck, in which the putatively known
proposition turns out to be true even though one’s epistemic position does not guarantee its
truth. With regard to the latter, many fallibilists are explicitly committed to the possibility
of knowledge on the basis of merely high probabilities.40 But this view generates a variety of
puzzles concerning one’s inability to know either the winner, or the losers, of an arbitrarily
large lottery. These arguments have received less attention than the ones we’ve discussed
concerning epistemic modals. So a re-evaluation is in order.
But however we choose to proceed, we must take care to ensure that the fallibilist thesis
under discussion is indeed of epistemological significance. Only then can we be sure that our
investigation is not in vain.
39See Reed (2012) for an overview of this literature.
40See the references in n. 37.
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5.0 PROBABILITY MODALS AND INFINITE DOMAINS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Natural language talk of what is likely or what is probable has a foot in two worlds: this
language would appear to have ties to the mathematical theory of probability, and yet talk of
what is likely is commonplace even among speakers with no special mathematical training.
How then should we approach the semantics of this language?
Semanticists were initially reluctant to base their theories on the quantitative notion of
probability employed by scientists and mathematicians. This latter notion may well have
its origins in the folk concept of probability, but it was thought to be a mistake to credit
ordinary language users with a tacit grasp of the mature theory itself.1
However, there has recently been a striking shift in opinion: semantics based on Kol-
mogorovian probability (hereafter: probabilistic semantics) have become widespread.2 One
reason for this change in attitude has been the recognition that non-probabilistic semantics
cannot easily account for explicitly quantitative assessments of probability, as in there is a
70% chance of rain. But what is perhaps more surprising is that non-probabilistic semantics
fail to capture intuitions about even basic inferences involving judgments of comparative
likelihood.
For example, on Kratzer’s canonical world-ordering semantics (Kratzer (1991b, 2012)),
an ordering on worlds generates an ordering on propositions, which in turn fixes the facts
1See Hamblin (1959, 234), Koopman (1940, 269-270), and Kratzer (2012, 25) for expressions of this
sentiment.
2Defenders include Cariani (2016), Carr (2015), Lassiter (2010, 2011, 2015), Moss (2013, 2015), Rothschild
(2012), Swanson (2006, 2011, 2016), and Yalcin (2007, 2010, 2011).
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about what is more/less/equally likely than what.3 But Lassiter (2010, 2011, 2015) and
Yalcin (2010) demonstrate that this semantics validates clearly invalid inference patterns
like the following:
The coin’s landing heads is as likely as its landing tails. Therefore, the coin’s landing
heads is as likely as any proposition whatsoever.
In contrast, probabilistic semantics validates a variety of intuitively valid inference patterns
and fails to validate obviously invalid inference patterns like the one above.4
Nevertheless, recent work by Holliday and Icard (2013) suggests that the shift away from
world-ordering semantics may be premature: they present a world-ordering semantics that
promises to capture the core inferences just as well. And indeed, their work has been widely
thought to achieve this aim.5
In this paper, I argue that the challenge remains: defenders of world-ordering semantics
have yet to offer a plausible semantics that captures the logic of comparative likelihood. I
show that Holliday & Icard’s semantics fails to validate one intuitively valid inference pattern
that is validated by probabilistic semantics. The countermodel turns on distinctive features
of infinitely large domains, but probabilistic semantics validates the inference nonetheless.
I go on to consider several ways of patching Holliday & Icard’s semantics to validate the
desired inference. But I argue that each has considerable costs that have no analogue for
probabilistic semantics. As a result, probabilistic semantics remains the better explanation
of the data.
5.2 PROBABILISTIC VERSUS WORLD-ORDERING SEMANTICS
Let’s begin by contrasting two approaches to the semantics of natural language probability
talk. (Readers eager to see the countermodel can skip to §5.4.)
3The label world-ordering semantics is due to Holliday and Icard (2013).
4See Lassiter (2010, 2011, 2015) and Yalcin (2010).
5See Cariani (2016, n. 9), Carr (2015, 697 n. 23), Lassiter (2015, 663), and Suzuki (2013, 216).
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Start with a standard propositional language L and extend it as follows:
• If φ and ψ are sentences of L , then p(φ > ψ)q is a sentence of L .
• If φ is a sentence of L , then p♦φq is a sentence of L .6
Sentences of the form (φ > ψ) are intended to model natural language judgments of com-
parative likelihood: φ is at least as likely as ψ. Sentences of the form ♦φ model talk of
epistemic possibility: it might be that φ.
We also add the following definitions:
• (φ > ψ) models φ is more likely than ψ and is defined as
(φ > ψ) ∧ ¬(ψ > φ).
• ∆φ models it is likely that φ and is defined as (φ > ¬φ).
• φ models talk of epistemic necessity—it must be that φ—and is defined as ¬♦¬φ.
What, then, is the semantics appropriate to L , in its intended interpretation? There
are two main approaches, which diverge in their semantics for >. Before setting out these
views, let’s give the semantic entries they have in common.
Let a model be a tuple M = 〈W,S, V 〉, where W is a non-empty set (intuitively, a
set of metaphysical possibilities), S is a non-empty set (intuitively, an information state
or a set of epistemic possibilities), and V is a function assigning elements of P(W ) to
atomic sentences A={p,q,...} (intuitively, V specifies which proposition is expressed by a
given atomic sentence). We then define an interpretation J·KM for M as follows:
• JφKM = V (φ) if φ ∈ A.
• J¬φKM = W − JφKM .
• J(φ ∧ ψ)KM = JφKM ∩ JψKM .
• J♦φKM = {w ∈ W : JφKM ∩ S 6= ∅}.7
A sentence φ is true at w in M (JφKwM = 1) iff w ∈ JφKM . A sentence is valid in M iff it is
true at every w ∈ W in M . A sentence is valid in a class of models C iff it is valid in every
6I omit the relevant corner quotes from here on out.
7I follow MacFarlane (2011, 2014) and Yalcin (2007) in using S to determine the interpretation of ♦φ,
as opposed to an accessibility relation. I opt for the former approach to simplify the semantics, since the
question of the world-sensitivity of ♦φ is not at issue in what follows.
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model in the class. A semantics validates an inference pattern iff the material conditional
whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises and whose consequent is the conclusion
is valid in the class of models defined by the semantics.
Our first approach to the semantics of > treats judgments of comparative likelihood as
qualitative comparisons of propositions, where these comparisons are in turn grounded in a
more fundamental ranking of the worlds that comprise each proposition.
For example, on Kratzer’s (1991b) semantics for >, context delivers a set of proposi-
tions O—called the ordering source—that induces a pre-order, O, on the members of S as
follows:8
w O w′ iff {α ∈ O : w ∈ α} ⊇ {α ∈ O : w′ ∈ α}.
Intuitively, the ordering source relevant to > represents a standard of normality, and worlds
are ranked higher the closer they come to matching the normal course of events.
Kratzer then uses this ranking of worlds to determine a ranking, &, of propositions:
α & β iff ∀w ∈ β : ∃w′ ∈ α : w′ O w.
That is, α is ranked at least as high as β iff every β-world can be paired with an α-world
that is at least as highly ranked.9 Finally, Kratzer takes (φ > ψ) to be true at a world in a
model iff JφKM ,S & JψKM ,S, where JφKM ,S = JφKM ∩ S.
Generalizing from the particulars of Kratzer’s approach, world-ordering semantics takes
models to be the following: 〈W,S, V,, ↑〉, where  is a pre-order on S, and ↑ is a lifting
operation—that is, a function from  to a binary relation, ↑, on P(S). The role of the
lifting operation is to take us from a ranking on worlds to a ranking on propositions. So, for
example, Kratzer’s definition of & is one way to lift a pre-order on worlds to a pre-order on
propositions. We finally let J(φ > ψ)KwM = 1 iff JφKM ,S ↑ JψKM ,S.10
8Note that a pre-order is a reflexive and transitive binary relation.
9This method of generating a ranking of propositions from a ranking of worlds is due to Lewis (1973).
10This generalization of Kratzer’s semantics and the term lifting operation are due to Holliday and Icard
(2013).
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However, as Lassiter (2010, 2011, 2015) and Yalcin (2010) point out, world-ordering
semantics with Kratzer’s (1991b) lifting operation faces what Lassiter (2015) calls the dis-
junction puzzle—namely, the semantics validates the following inference pattern:
I1:
P1. φ > ψ
P2. φ > χ
C. φ > (ψ ∨ χ)
I1 is clearly invalid: from the fact that heads is at least as likely as heads, and heads is at
least as likely as tails, it does not follow that heads is at least as likely as heads or tails.11
Lassiter and Yalcin use the disjunction puzzle to motivate an alternative semantics for >.
On probabilistic semantics, judgments of comparative likelihood are grounded in a quantita-
tive ranking of propositions. Models are as follows: 〈W,S, V,F , µ〉, where F is a σ-algebra
of subsets of S, and µ is a finitely additive probability measure. That is, F is a subset of
P(S) such that S ∈ F , and F is closed under complementation and countable union. µ is
a function from F to [0,1] such that µ(S) = 1 and µ(α ∪ β) = µ(α) + µ(β), for disjoint α
and β. We then let J(φ > ψ)KwM = 1 iff µ(JφKM ,S) ≥ µ(JψKM ,S).
Probabilistic semantics avoids the disjunction puzzle and also validates a range of intu-
itively valid inference patterns identified by Yalcin (2010).12 As a result, there appear to be
solid grounds for favoring probabilistic over world-ordering semantics.13
5.3 HOLLIDAY AND ICARD’S ALTERNATIVE
As Kratzer (2012) notes, her (1991b) choice of lifting operation is one among many. It thus
remains to be seen whether one can formulate an alternative lifting operation that yields
better predictions.
11This example is due to Yalcin (2010).
12See Lassiter (2010, 2011, 2015) and Yalcin (2010).
13My focus in this paper is the debate between probabilistic and world-ordering semantics, so I will leave
aside the question of whether a probabilistic semantics should be based on finite additivity, countable addi-
tivity, or qualitative additivity (see Holliday and Icard (2013) and Lassiter (2015) for discussion of qualitative
additivity; see §5.5 for discussion of countable additivity). I also leave aside the question of whether proba-
bilistic semantics fares better than what Holliday and Icard (2013) call event-ordering semantics.
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Holliday & Icard (2013) claim to do just that: they present an alternative lifting operation
that promises to resolve the disjunction puzzle and capture the core inferences involving
probability talk:
m-lifting: JφKM ,S m JψKM ,S iff there exists an injective function
f : JψKM ,S → JφKM ,S such that ∀w ∈ JψKM ,S : f(w)  w.
An injective function is one that maps every distinct element in the domain to a distinct
element in the codomain: that is, for every w,w′ in the domain, if f(w) = f(w′), then
w = w′. Thus, m-lifting tells us that a proposition α is at least as highly ranked as β iff
each β-world can be mapped to a distinct α-world that is at least as highly ranked.
It’s easy to see how this new lifting operation resolves the disjunction puzzle. Consider
an instance of I1: ((p > q) ∧ (p > ¬q))→ (p > (q ∨ ¬q)). Suppose W = S = {w,w′}, where
w is the sole p-world and q-world. Our instance of I1 will be false at w if w  w′.
Intuitively, m-lifting invalidates I1 because the same p-world can’t do double duty in
matching up to each of the q and ¬q-worlds: this is ruled out by the requirement that each
(q ∨ ¬q)-world be mapped to a distinct p-world in order for p to be at least as likely as the
disjunction.
Moreover, Holliday & Icard claim that world-ordering semantics with m-lifting validates
all of the core, valid inferences on Yalcin’s (2010) list. Consequently, semanticists will have
to look elsewhere for grounds favoring probabilistic over world-ordering semantics.
To be clear: the threat here is not that there are no grounds for favoring one semantics
over the other. There are other motivations for probabilistic semantics, and there are ques-
tions about whether m-lifting can capture other data about the use of probability modals.14
But the general lesson of Holliday & Icard (2013) is thought to be the following: whatever
the grounds will be for favoring one semantics over the other, they will not concern the logic
of comparative likelihood.
14See Lassiter (2010, 2011, 2015), Moss (2013, 2015), Rothschild (2012), Swanson (2006, 2011, 2016),
and Yalcin (2007, 2011) for discussion of alternative motivations for probabilistic semantics. See Lassiter
(2015) for criticisms of m-lifting distinct from those I raise below. Note also that caution must be applied
when integrating m-lifting into Kratzer’s larger account of modal language. I1 is arguably valid for deontic
comparatives, so m-lifting cannot serve as a general lifting operation for all comparative modal language.
Thanks to Eric Swanson for noting this point.
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5.4 THE COUNTERMODEL
As it turns out, the dialectic is more complex. Holliday & Icard’s semantics still fails to
validate one intuitively valid inference pattern. The inference pattern in question is what
Yalcin (2010) calls V11:
V11:
P1. φ > ψ
P2. ∆ψ
C. ∆φ
V11 is clearly a valid inference pattern. For example, if rain is at least as likely as high
winds, then if high winds are likely, rain is likely as well.
But the following constitutes a countermodel to V11 for world-ordering semantics with
m-lifting:
Let M = 〈W,S, V,, ↑〉, where:
W = S = N
V (p) = {x ∈ N : x is even}
 is a flat ranking: for every w,w′ ∈ S,w  w′
↑ = m-lifting
Choose any w ∈ W . The following instance of V11 is false at w:
(*) ((p > (p ∨ ¬p)) ∧∆(p ∨ ¬p))→ ∆p
To see why, notice that since every pair of worlds in S is equally ranked, establishing the
first conjunct of the antecedent of (*) simply requires showing that there exists an injection
from the (p ∨ ¬p)-worlds to the p-worlds. Here is such an injection: f(x) = 2x. Next, note
that the second conjunct of the antecedent is true at w since there is trivially an injection
from the empty set to N, but not vice versa. However, the consequent of the conditional is
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false at w since (¬p > p) is true at w: f(x) = (x + 1) is an injection from the p-worlds to
the ¬p-worlds.15
What drives this countermodel is the following distinctive feature of infinitely large sets:
a proper subset of a set may have the same cardinality as the set itself. In this case, V (p) is
a subset of N that has the same cardinality as N. Hence, since each element of N is ranked
equally high, p will be at least as likely as N. But the entire domain, N, is trivially likely,
while p is not, since its complement is equally likely. Hence, the semantics fails to validate
V11.16
In contrast, it’s straightforward to verify that probabilistic semantics validates V11 re-
gardless of the size of S:
Proof. If J∆ψKwM = 1, then µ(JψKM ,S) > .5. Hence, if J(φ > ψ)KwM = 1, then µ(JφKM ,S) ≥
µ(JψKM ,S), in which case µ(JφKM ,S) > .5, and thus J∆φKwM = 1.
It may be helpful to re-state these points with the aid of a simple interpretation of our
countermodel. Let every x ∈ N stand for a world containing x stars.17 p therefore expresses
the proposition that the number of stars is even. Our countermodel then demonstrates
that world-ordering semantics with m-lifting invalidates the following inference when S is
infinitely large:
P1. An even number of stars is at least as likely as an even or odd number of stars.
P2. An even or odd number of stars is likely.
C. An even number of stars is likely.
Probabilistic semantics validates the inference nonetheless. Thus, probabilistic semantics
has a clear advantage over even the most sophisticated, world-ordering alternative.
15Our model also constitutes a countermodel to what Holliday & Icard call V13:
V13:
P1. (φ ∧ ¬ψ) > ⊥
C. (φ ∨ ψ) > ψ
The following instance is false at any w ∈ W : (((p ∨ ¬p) ∧ ¬p) > ⊥) → (((p ∨ ¬p) ∨ p) > p). See §5.6 for
further discussion of V13.
16We can construct a similar countermodel with an uncountably infinite domain. Let W = S = [0, 2pi),
let V (p) = [0, pi], and retain the rest of our original countermodel. (*) is false in this model for the same
reason: the cardinality of V (p) is the same as that of S and that of J¬pK.
17This interpretation is inspired by an example from Portner (2009, 33).
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5.5 POSSIBLE REPLIES
As we saw in the previous section, the shift to m-lifting does not suffice to capture all of the
intuitively valid inferences involving probability talk. However, it’s worth exploring whether
defenders of world-ordering semantics can find a way to undermine the significance of our
countermodel. I consider three replies below.
5.5.1 Add a Density Measure
Implicit in m-lifting is the thought that judgments of comparative likelihood involve com-
paring the number of worlds in which each proposition is true. Requiring there to exist a
certain injection from JψKM ,S to JφKM ,S in order to verify (φ > ψ) is one way of capturing
this thought: there exists such a function only if the cardinality of JφKM ,S is at least as great
as that of JψKM ,S. But one might take our countermodel to illustrate that cardinality is too
crude a notion to play this role: intuitively, there are fewer evens than natural numbers, but
their cardinalities are the same.
One might instead appeal to the notion of density to capture this intuition: any given
stretch of natural numbers will contain fewer evens than natural numbers. Perhaps such
judgments of density underlie our judgments of comparative likelihood: α’s being at least
as likely as β requires not just that there be an injection from the β-worlds to the α-worlds,
but that the density of the α-worlds be at least as great as the density of the β-worlds. Such
a lifting operation will block our countermodel, since the density of the natural numbers is
greater than that of the evens.
But the problem with this reply is that any rigorous specification of such a density
measure will invoke precisely the sort of mathematically sophisticated tacit knowledge that
defenders of non-probabilistic semantics seek to avoid (e.g. tacit knowledge of limits, and so
on). Moreover, the very idea of density is that of a frequency within a reference class, so
any appeal to tacit knowledge of density presupposes a tacit grasp of quantitative probability.
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5.5.2 Infinite Domains are Irrelevant
Our countermodel crucially relies on the distinctive characteristics of infinitely large sets in
order to verify the antecedent of (*): the cardinality of a proper subset can be equal to the
cardinality of the entire set itself. And indeed, Holliday & Icard’s semantics validates V11
over the class of models in which S is finite. Perhaps such a restriction is warranted, given
the aims of natural language semantics: infinite domains play no role in the thoughts of the
layman.
But it’s hard to give this reply much credence. To be sure, it’s common in semantics to
focus on models with finite domains: for instance, semanticists will often stipulate a finite
domain of epistemically accessible worlds in order to secure the Limit Assumption and so
simplify their semantics for deontic modals.18 But such restrictions are mere stipulations—
and for good reason.
Consider the aforementioned interpretation of our countermodel: one can wonder about
the number of stars in the universe, and as long as one is not willing to place a finite upper
bound on the answer, one’s information state is best modeled by a countably infinite domain
of possible worlds, each containing an ever-greater number of stars.19 Portner (2009, 32–33)
goes so far as to claim that the domain of accessible worlds recognized by ordinary language
users is typically infinite. But it suffices for our purposes to note that the domain may
sometimes be infinite, and thus it would be a mistake to declare our countermodel irrelevant
on the grounds that ordinary speakers never traffic in infinite domains.
5.5.3 Models are Path-Finite
In a post-print of their original (2013), Holliday & Icard add the following assumption:
[W]e assume world-ordering models are path-finite, i.e., there is no infinite path w1 
w2  w3 . . . of distinct worlds, just as with a finitely additive measure, there is no infinite
18Note that our countermodel is consistent with the Limit Assumption.
19We can stipulate that one knows or believes that the number of stars is finite.
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sequence of distinct worlds with non-zero, non-decreasing measure (post-print, 526).20
This assumption allows for infinite domains but will still block our countermodel: a model
with a flat ranking on an infinite domain is not path-finite. And indeed, V11 is valid in the
class of world-ordering models with path-finite rankings.
However, this strategy has several costs. First, the path-finiteness requirement is ad
hoc: it is motivated only on the grounds that it validates an inference that the semantics
would otherwise render invalid. Now, Holliday & Icard do draw an analogy between the
path-finiteness requirement and a similar constraint on probabilistic semantics: “with a
finitely additive measure, there is no infinite sequence of distinct worlds with non-zero,
non-decreasing measure” (post-print, 526). But this analogy is flawed. One cannot have
a finitely additive, non-zero, non-decreasing measure over an infinite domain—but one can
have a finitely additive measure over an infinite domain that assigns probability zero to each
outcome. Indeed, one of the principal motivations for finite but not countable additivity is
that it allows one to assign probability zero to each outcome in a countably infinite domain
and thereby capture the judgment that each outcome is equally likely.21 Furthermore, if
the sample space is continuous—i.e. if it contains an uncountably infinite set of possible
outcomes—then we must assign probability zero to an uncountable number of outcomes.22
Defenders of probabilistic semantics are aware of these facts. Several of them explicitly
allow for assigning probability zero to every outcome in an infinite domain.23 Thus, without
further argument, there is no reason to believe that defenders of probabilistic semantics have
to make a stipulation analogous to the path-finiteness requirement. The former theorists
can allow for assigning probability zero to every outcome in an infinite domain, but Holliday
& Icard cannot allow for a flat ranking over an infinite domain: as we saw in §5.4, models
with such rankings invalidate V11.
The second problem with the path-finiteness requirement concerns the origin of the
ranking on worlds. The standard account—due to Kratzer (1981; 1991; 2012)—is that the
20Post-print available at https://philosophy.berkeley.edu/file/869/Holliday_and_Icard_SALT_
23.pdf (last accessed Feb. 16, 2017). See Harrison-Trainor, Holliday and Icard (forthcoming) and Harrison-
Trainor, Holliday and Icard (2017) for further development of path-finite, world-ordering semantics.
21See de Finetti (1974).
22See Williamson (2007).
23See Cariani (2016), Carr (2015), and Yalcin (2007).
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ranking on worlds is fixed by a contextually-determined set of ordering source propositions,
as we reviewed in §5.2. But suppose the set of ordering source propositions is empty: every
world will trivially verify the same ordering source propositions and will thus be equally
ranked. Consequently, if the domain of epistemic possibilities is infinite, the path-finiteness
requirement precludes an empty ordering source (recall that a flat ranking on an infinite
domain is not path-finite). However, this is a bad result. Possibility modals are often
thought to have readings that involve an empty ordering source, so why should the situation
be any different for probability modals, or different when the domain is infinite? The ordering
source for probability modals is supposed to represent a contextually determined standard
of normality. But the context of use might simply fail to determine some such standard
and thereby leave the ordering source empty. The path-finiteness requirement thus conflicts
with the standard account of what determines the ranking on worlds in the first place: the
mere fact that the domain is infinite should not rule out the possibility of an empty ordering
source.
The final problem with the path-finiteness requirement concerns our intuitions about
examples involving infinite domains. Recall the star interpretation of our countermodel
discussed above: suppose we are wondering how many stars there are in the universe, and
we are unwilling to place a finite upper bound on the answer. Here our information state
is best modelled by a countably infinite domain of possible worlds, each containing an ever-
greater number of stars. Now, prima facie, it is possible to be in a coherent information state
of this sort according to which, above a certain threshold, any number of stars is as likely
as any other number of stars. Or suppose we are wondering about the precise value of some
physical constant. Again, it is plausible that there exists some state of belief or evidence
according to which each of an infinite range of values is equally likely. One candidate for such
an information state is that of total ignorance.24 There are others. One might possess—
24It is controversial whether a single probability measure can adequately represent a state of total igno-
rance. A referee notes that there is no constructive proof of a uniform distribution over the natural numbers
(see Lauwers (2009)). And the non-constructive choices required to generate such a distribution seem at
odds with the distribution’s modelling a state of total ignorance. But as the referee also notes, modelling ig-
norance by a set of probability measures may help avoid this problem. See Rothschild (2012) for an example
of a probabilistic semantics that relies on sets of measures. Finally, it may be easier to model ignorance when
the domain is uncountably infinite—e.g. consider the Lebesgue measure on [0,1], on which the probability
of every interval in [0,1] is equal to its length.
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or merely believe that one possesses—positive evidence that the value of this constant is
determined by a random process. All of this is to say: our semantics for probability modals
should not rule out the possibility that each of an infinite set of outcomes is equally likely.
But the path-finiteness requirement does rule this out. Equiprobability of outcomes
requires a flat ranking—one that is not path-finite if the domain of epistemic possibilities is
infinitely large.25 By contrast, probabilistic semantics allows for equiprobability of outcomes
across an infinite domain. One need only assign each outcome probability zero.26
To sum up: the path-finiteness requirement secures V11 but at the expense of (a) in-
troducing an ad hoc constraint on world-orders; (b) precluding an empty ordering source
when the domain is infinite; (c) ruling out the possibility of equiprobable outcomes across
an infinite domain.
5.6 PARTNERS IN CRIME?
In defending probabilistic semantics, I’ve twice appealed to probability-zero epistemic pos-
sibilities. But one might wonder whether allowing such possibilities leads to undesirable
consequences. If so, one could argue that a viable probabilistic semantics must indeed make
a stipulation analogous to the path-finiteness requirement: models cannot include a measure
µ such that µ({w1}) ≤ µ({w2}) ≤ µ({w3}) . . . for an infinite sequence of distinct worlds.
Such a measure is possible only if each world is assigned probability zero (any greater value
would violate the requirement that µ(S) = 1).
So: what sort of undesirable consequences might follow from allowing probability-zero
possibilities? It is true that if we allow for probability-zero possibities, leaving the rest of our
probabilistic semantics unchanged, our theory will invalidate a plausible principle connecting
epistemic possibility and comparative likelihood:
25A world-order in which each possibility is incomparable will deliver the result that none of the out-
comes are more or less likely than the others. However, incomparability of outcomes is not the same as
equiprobability—i.e. that each is equally likely.
26Equiprobability of outcomes across a countably infinite domain requires a finitely but not countably
additive measure. Equiprobability across an uncountably infinite domain is consistent with countable addi-
tivity.
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RegularityC : ♦φ→ (φ > ⊥)27
Recall that on the probabilistic semantics discussed in §5.2, facts about comparative likeli-
hood are settled by comparing the measure value of each proposition. Thus, since contra-
dictions receive probability zero, no probability-zero possibility will be more likely than a
contradiction. This is a highly unintuitive result. Returning to our star case above, it seems
absurd to claim that a googol stars in the universe is no more likely than 0 = 1.28
However, it is possible to amend our probabilistic semantics to validate RegularityC while
allowing for probability-zero possibilities. To see how, first distinguish RegularityC from a
similar principle, also called “Regularity”, that is often discussed in formal epistemology and
probability theory:
RegularityP : if α 6= ∅ and α ∈ F , then µ(α) > 0.29
RegularityP simply expresses a constraint on probability measures, yet it’s natural to think
that RegularityP is the only way to secure RegularityC in a probabilistic semantics. If so, one
cannot validate RegularityC if one accepts probability-zero possibilities: such possibilities
violate RegularityP , since they would be non-empty members of F that do not receive
greater-than-zero probability.
But the natural thought is false. There are other routes to validating RegularityC in a
probabilistic semantics. Consider what I’ll call the Modified Probabilistic Semantics :
J(φ > ψ)KwM= 1 iff (i) µ(JφKM ,S) ≥ µ(JψKM ,S),
(ii) J(♦ψ → ♦φ)KwM = 1, and
(iii) J(ψ → φ)KwM = 1.
This semantics ensures that a contradiction is never at least as likely as an epistemically
possible proposition—even if this proposition has probability zero. But any proposition is
27The subscript indicates that the principle constrains judgments of comparative likelihood; I discuss a
different type of regularity principle below.
28This case is adapted from an example due to Wesley Holliday.
29“Regularity” is sometimes formulated as the stronger thesis that all non-empty subsets of S receive
positive probability. See Ha´jek (ms.) for discussion.
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at least as likely as a contradiction, so an epistemically possible proposition will always be
more likely than a contradiction.30 The semantics also ensures that epistemically necessary
propositions will be more likely than those that merely receive probability one. This is a de-
sirable result: additivity requires that the negation of any probability-zero possibility receive
probability one, but such propositions—e.g. the proposition that the number of stars is not
equal to a googol—are clearly less likely than epistemic necessities, such as the proposition
that the number of stars is either even or odd. Finally, the semantics validates V11 and the
other validities on Yalcin’s (2010) list.
Now, the semantics will fail to validate what Holliday & Icard call V13:
V13:
P1. (φ ∧ ¬ψ) > ⊥
C. (φ ∨ ψ) > ψ
But it’s not obvious that this inference is actually valid. I take it that V13 is not self-evident
in the way that V11 is. Rather, V13 reflects something like the following line of reasoning:
if (φ ∧ ¬ψ) is more likely than a contradiction, then it’s possible for φ to occur without ψ;
but then there are more ways for (φ∨ψ) to be true than for ψ itself to be true—namely, all
of the ψ-ways plus the (φ ∧ ¬ψ)-ways. This is a valid line of reasoning when the domain of
possibilities is finite. Not so when the domain is infinite. Suppose φ expresses the proposition
that the number of stars is a multiple of 3, and ψ expresses the proposition that the number
of stars is a multiple of 6. It is possible for the number of stars to be a multiple of 3 and
not a multiple of 6, but the cardinality of {w : the number of stars in w is a multiple of
3 or a multiple of 6} is the same as the cardinality of {w : the number of stars in w is a
multiple of 6}. Thus, there is a perfectly respectable notion of size according to which the
above line of reasoning goes wrong when the domain is infinite. Of course, others might wish
to understand size in terms of the proper superset relation, in which case there is nothing
wrong with the above line of reasoning even in the case of an infinite domain. But this only
shows that we reach a standoff over V13.
30See Easwaran (2014) for alternative ways of capturing RegularityC without RegularityP .
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Still, it might be thought that our semantics falters on a related point. Surely there
being 1010 or 1011 stars is more likely than there being 1011 stars, but if each disjunct is
assigned probability zero, the disjunction will be just as likely as either disjunct.31 Again
though, infinite domains reveal a problem. Intuitively, the disjunction is more likely because
there are more ways for it to be true. But it’s easy to miss that when the domain is infinite,
the disjunction and each disjunct are still false in the same number of worlds—namely, a
countably infinite number. We can then reason as follows. The disjunction and each disjunct
are just as likely to be false, since they are false in the same number of worlds and there
are no grounds for thinking that the set of worlds in which one is false is more likely than
the set of worlds in which the other is false. And since the disjunction and each disjunct are
equally likely to be false, they are equally likely to be true.
What this shows is that we essentially confront a puzzle. Each of the following is plau-
sible, but they are jointly inconsistent:
• The disjunction is more likely than either disjunct.
• The disjunction and each disjunct are equally likely to be false.
• If two sentences are equally likely to be false, then they are equally likely to be true.
I suggest we reject the first. Its plausibility results from the failure to recognize that when
the domain is infinite, each sentence is false in the same number of worlds.
It remains to show that our semantics is not ad hoc: it is motivated by considerations
other than those of securing RegularityC while allowing for probability-zero possibilities.
The general idea behind this semantics is that judgments of comparative likelihood are
sensitive to the epistemic possibility or necessity of the propositions so compared. Much
of the significance of probability talk stems from its use as a guide in the formation of our
attitudes towards non-modalized propositions: the question of whether α is at least as likely
as β is ultimately aimed at addressing the questions of whether α and whether β. So it would
be surprising if judgments of comparative likelihood essentially throw out the information
about whether α or β is epistemically possible, or epistemically necessary—information that
is clearly relevant to the question of whether α and whether β. But this is exactly what
31cf. Pruss (2014).
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would happen if we simply compare the measure values of each proposition: each might have
probability zero while only one is epistemically possible, and each might have probability
one while only one is epistemically necessary. Similarly, consider how we often go about
determining whether α is at least as likely as β: we check to see whether the grounds
favoring α are at least as strong as those favoring β. If this is how we make judgments of
comparative likelihood, it is no surprise that the epistemic possibility or necessity of each
proposition bears on such judgments. For if either is epistemically impossible, this fact
undercuts any evidence in its favor. And if either is epistemically necessary, the other must
also be epistemically necessary if it is to be supported by grounds of equal strength.
I take the upshot to be the following. Defenders of world-ordering semantics cannot find
partners in crime to mitigate the damages of requiring path-finite world-orders: there exists a
well-motivated probabilistic semantics that validates V11, allows for equiprobable outcomes
across an infinite domain, and retains RegularityC . As a result, probabilistic semantics still
provides the best account of the inference patterns governing natural language probability
talk.
To be sure, nothing I’ve said rules out the possibility that an alternative lifting operation
will give us everything we want. But it remains an open question whether such an operation




In §3.4.3, I showed how cloudy contextualism provides a unified explanation of the shared
eavesdropping data. Here I show that one can also give a unified explanation of the data in
a relativist framework. We saw in §3.3.2 that the Heterodox Semantics is not the right
semantics in which to develop relativism about reason claims, since this semantics makes the
wrong predictions about how reason claims embed. But there is another option, one that
makes use of what Kratzer (1977, 1981, 2012) calls a “modal base”—i.e. a function f from
worlds to (simplifying a bit) bodies of information (i.e. sets of worlds).
Suppose we use a modal base to give a parallel compositional semantics for reason and
modal claims:
might φ is true at a context, modal base, and world triple <c,f ,w> iff f(w) is compatible
with the proposition expressed by φ at c.
there is reason to believe that φ is true at <c,f ,w> iff f(w) counts in favor of believing
the proposition expressed by φ at c.1
We can then account for the difference in embedding data by positing different default
constraints on the value of f : for reason claims, the value of this parameter will be a function
tracking the information contained in epistemic states; for modal claims, the value of this
1This semantics for reason claims is just a sketch of the general shape such a theory should take. Some
might wish to take the counting-in-favor-of relation as primitive; others might wish to reduce it to a prob-
abilistic relation. There is also a question about whether reason claims should have a quantifier in their
semantics, or whether their surface grammar is misleading. I take up these issues in Chapter 2.
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parameter will be a function tracking relevant truths, where there is no requirement that
such truths be contained in epistemic states. On this semantics, reason and modal claims
emerge as two different “flavors” of modal language in general.
To see how this semantics works, consider the following sentences:
(1) John might be infected.
(2) There is reason to believe that John is infected.
The modal base for (1) might be a function from a world w to the set of worlds consistent
with John’s symptoms at w. The modal base for (2) might be a function from a world w to
the set of worlds consistent with what the speaker of the context knows at w. The reason
claim will then be true at a world depending on how things stand with what the speaker
knows at that world, while the modal claim will be true at a world depending on how things
stand with John’s symptoms at that world. These propositions will likely be non-equivalent.
Consider a world at which John’s symptoms rule out the presence of an infection but the
speaker possesses misleading evidence suggesting that John has the characteristic symptoms
of the infection. This will be a world at which (1) is false but (2) is true.
Now, to give a compositional semantics is not yet to settle what proposition (if any) is
expressed by a typical use of a sentence.2 One might therefore employ our above semantics
in the context of two very different theories of the objects of assertion. One such theory
integrates our semantics with a contextualist account of the information conveyed by reason
and modal claims. On this account, the context of use settles the value of the modal base
parameter f , and a use of a reason or modal claim will express an ordinary proposition
(i.e. a set of worlds). However, one might instead take the value of f to be settled by the
context of assessment, not the context of use. On this account, a use of a reason or modal
claim will not express an ordinary proposition. Instead, the use will express a formal object
that is modal base-neutral and so will be true relative to some modal base-world pairs and
false relative to others. The result is a kind of non-standard relativism—non-standard in
the sense that current relativist theories are developed in the framework of the Heterodox
Semantics. This type of relativist theory will then explain the eavesdropping data in a
2This point is emphasized in Dummett (1978, Chapter 1), Lewis (1980), Ninan (2010), and Yalcin (2014).
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unified and familiar way: the speaker is warranted in making a reason or modal claim if
this claim true at the context of assessment she presently occupies, but the eavesdropper
is warranted in rejecting the speaker’s assertion if the claim is false at the eavesdropper’s
context of assessment.
This type of non-standard relativism opens up the possibility of a different kind of Split
View than the one we discussed in §3.4.1. Suppose one adopts a relativist implementation
of the Heterodox Semantics for modal claims and our non-standard relativism for reason
claims. The resulting view will offer a unified, relativist explanation of the eavesdropping
data. This view can also explain the difference in embedding data: the view can employ
the existing Heterodox Semantics explanation of the unembeddability of epistemic con-
tradictions and can co-opt the explanation of the embeddability of reason contradictions I
gave above. Now, I have no knock-down objection to this proposal, but let me explain why
I find it less satisfying than the proposal I’ve given in the main text. The central drawback
to this type of Split View is its lack of theoretical economy. The Heterodox Seman-
tics for modal claims is standardly motivated by its ability to explain the eavesdropping
and epistemic contradiction data about modal claims—data that is alleged to be difficult to
accommodate within a non-heterodox semantics for modal claims (see, for instance, MacFar-
lane (2011, 2014) and Yalcin (2007, 2011)). However, I’ve just argued that one can explain
each piece of data in the context of the standard, Kratzerian compositional semantics for
modal claims. It is far simpler, then, to just give a single compositional semantics for both




Here I present a formal argument for why any plausible extension of the Heterodox Se-
mantics will predict that reason contradictions are incoherent to entertain.
Let Rφ be an abbreviation of there is reason to believe that φ, let No-Rφ be an abbre-
viation of there is no reason to believe that φ, let c be a variable ranging over contexts,
let w range over metaphysical possibilities, let s range over information states—i.e. sets of
metaphysical possibilities—and let J·K be the interpretation function—i.e. a function from
expressions to their semantic values.1
The following theses jointly entail that no coherent supposition state “accepts” a reason
contradiction, where a supposition state s accepts that φ iff ∀w ∈ s : JφKc,s,w is true:
(a) For all points of evaluation <c,s,w>, if JRφKc,s,w is true, thenJNo-RφKc,s,w is false.
(b) For all <c,s,w>, if s ⊆ JφKc,s, then JRφKc,s,w is true.
Proof. Suppose s accepts that φ. By definition, s accepts that φ iff ∀w ∈ s : JφKc,s,w
is true iff ∀w ∈ s : w ∈ JφKc,s iff s ⊆ JφKc,s. Hence, by (b), JRφKc,s,w is true, for all worlds
w. Whence, by (a), JNo-RφKc,s,w is false, for all worlds w. Thus, ∀w ∈ s : JNo-RφKc,s,w is
false. But by definition, s accepts that No-Rφ only if ∀w ∈ s : JNo-RφKc,s,w is true. Hence,
1Here is an example of how the interpretation function works. Take an expression φ. In standard two-
dimensional semantics, expressions are assigned extensions (e.g. truth-values) relative to a context c and, in
a simple case, an index consisting of a world parameter w. JφKc would then be a function from worlds to
truth-values, or equivalently, a set of possible worlds—namely, those at which the proposition expressed by
φ at c is true.
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s accepts that φ ∧ No-Rφ only if ∀w ∈ s : JNo-RφKc,s,w is false and ∀w ∈ s : JNo-RφKc,s,w is
true. So s accepts that φ ∧ No-Rφ only if s = ∅. But s was arbitrary, so for all s, s accepts
that φ ∧ No-Rφ only if s = ∅.
See §3.3.2 for my arguments that any plausible, heterodox-style semantics for reason
claims must accept (a) and (b).
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